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### Contention One-Endless War

#### The United States Government justifies its targeted killing operations with the theory of Just War, the idea that there can be moral justifications for conflict and moral ways of waging war. As the United States Government rationalizes its current wars, it has conversely opened a space for challenging the entire foundation of State killing. Interrogating the justifications for targeted killing operations exposes the inherent contradictions in just war theory.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

As drones become the new centerpiece of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency warfare, questions regarding their usage have escalated in recent months, particularly in terms of military strategy, political oversight, international relations, and the host of by moral considerations over the inherent scope and scale of the lethal violence that comes with any war. The current administration has purported to take such concerns with seriousness proportionate to what is at stake in a systematic program of targeted killing, now increasingly undertaken through these new technologies.4 It remains unclear exactly how that moral seriousness shapes or delimits the range of possibilities and the kinds of decisions that are made, since authorizing the killing of a particular person suspected of terrorism is not morally significant because of the gravitas of the authorization or who is unable to sleep at night, but because of the reasons for it and their moral intelligibility. The most well-known exponent of that moral seriousness is John Brennan, former national security advisor to the Obama administration, who was entrusted for years by the President with oversight over the UAV program in the Yemen and Africa.5 These programs in their full scope have always been developed and deployed between the diverse armed services and what has become the frankly paramilitary nature of the Central Intelligence Agency. Oversight in Pakistan belonged to the CIA, while deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq fell to the Pentagon. Obama exercised immediate oversight only in the domains of the Yemen and the Sahel - and thus the difficulties of Obama’s assertions that his own moral seriousness in orchestrating the drone program was in some meaningful way illustrative of the level of moral gravitas that accompanied the development and deployment of the new UAVs in any context. Obama’s recent appointment of Brennan to the directorate of the CIA may have been the public occasion for venting the considerable controversies that do exist around the drone programs. But for Obama it provided the administration with the capacity to centralize the programs that did exist into a command structure that would actually control the paramilitary arm of the CIA, never otherwise subject to the Pentagon or the armed services, and to tie those forces together in a way that did at least provide for the potential level of moral scrutiny in the UAV programs that the President envisaged. The appointment was a candid move to place someone in a position of unprecedented power and influence over an incredibly sophisticated and powerful system of covert operations and targeted killings, who was also personally and visibly committed to a similar form of moral scrutiny over targeted killings, and who purportedly shared “the mind of the President” on such matters.6 Drone Warfare and Just War Theory Brennan credits his ethical formation to his Catholicism and his education by the Jesuits at Georgetown University - and that brings into focus a particular kind of moral approach broadly recognizable to many as just war theory. 7 The parameters and core commitments of just war theory have been around long enough and deployed consistently enough, to make explication unnecessary. Just war theory in different guises has been advocated by Catholics and Protestants alike for centuries, and forays into similar or comparable forms of thought in Jewish and Islamic contexts have also emerged. Volumes have streamed forth from academics, policy specialists, and pundits over the last few decades concerning just and unjust wars and the implications of those deliberations for American military deployments. Previous foreign policy “realists”, typified by Henry Kissinger and the architects of the Vietnam War and the Cold War, were less enthralled by this kind of moral scrutiny. Just war theorists after World War II, and especially after Vietnam, have consistently portrayed McNamara, Kissinger, and assorted allies as champions of a potentially vicious Realpolitik in which reasons of state trumped moral deliberation and constraint. The old adage held that all is fair in love and war. 8 Realism in foreign policy has been undoubtedly oversimplified by advocates of just war theory. But just war theory itself has been complicated by the use of modern weapons purportedly to save lives in intractable conflicts. The prevalence of obliteration bombing in Germany and Japan by the Allies during the Second World War, not to mention the decision to drop the newly-developed atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, brought to light the use of just war theory to challenge the propriety of certain kinds of actions on moral grounds in an otherwise justified war.9 But the potential for those new weapons was never recognized by presidents or military planners as an exceptional means of last resort, as the Truman administration frankly understood when it loaded B-52s with atomic bombs to face the standoff produced by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June of 1948. The development of nuclear weapons by virtually all sides of the Cold War ended that monopoly over prospectively less costly ways to wage wars, and provided the most serious moral crisis for just war theorists since such discourse was invented. The failure of conventional weaponry in Vietnam also had a significant impact upon the moral framework of just war theory. The devastation wrought during that war provoked more moral objection and outrage than any American military campaign since the Philippines, and the heightened influence of just war theorists owes something to this fact.10 Brennan’s fealty to Catholic approaches to just war theory troubles some critics, and religious metaphors have been circulated at least since a Washington Post exposé on the drone program described him as almost a “priest” given his moral gravitas and the seriousness with which he takes the just war tradition.11 Just war theory became a staple of Roman Catholic social thought at least with the First Vatican Council, which canonized Thomas Aquinas as the exemplary theologian for the Church. Early fin de siècle neoThomism underwrote what became in 1944 John Ford’s excoriation of obliteration bombing as a morally defensible tactic for fighting an otherwise just war - and that along with the advocacy of John Courtney Murray served more than any other single instance to cement the perception among just war advocates that the whole program was about moral restraint in a time of conflict. Consequent, as well as controversial, statements issued decades later by Catholic bishops in the United States argued that the use nuclear weapons was never morally permissible under any circumstances because of the very weapons used, and the apparent impossibility of using them discriminately.12 Something deeply disturbing to just war advocates, and indicative of the anti-nuclear positions taken, continued to circulate in the threat postures of “mutually assured destruction” contained in the theory of nuclear deterrence.13 The slip of the nuclear trigger was dangerously close and only circumstantially avoided during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Yet the annual national security reviews published by the United States continue to affirm the right to use nuclear weapons both as deterrence and defense - a point never lost upon the powers who have sought to develop a nuclear capacity as counter-deterrence to the United States or other nuclear powers. And so advocates of just war theory that rose to positions of prominence after Vietnam have nevertheless had to live with the persistent declaration of nuclear deterrence articulated by every presidential administration since the Soviet Union acquired its own weapons of mass destruction. Whatever just war advocacy Brennan brings to the moral perspective regarding drones finds it place in that complex and unsettled landscape of the last century, when entire cities have been leveled by astoundingly brutal military tactics, and the threat of using these tactics continues. The challenge of nuclear weapons exhibited the deep tensions and disagreements that often mark just war theory in any form. To speak of just war theory now as precariously situated in a state of existential crisis is to peel away the layers of intelligibility that come with the oversimplified and reductive understandings most often advocated in contemporary contexts, something Brennan’s own language often mirrors. Existential crises do imply that a particular approach to just war thinking has imploded in very real historical circumstances, and that the familiar ways of understanding the stakes of just war theory have been shaken. Most advocates would shun the description of just war theory as experiencing any form of crisis, especially considering its relative success in shaping public perception and military strategic doctrine. Yet it remains the case, notwithstanding the arguments of some contemporary advocates, that whatever just war theory is today remains quite unlike what it has been before. Weapons technologies have advanced, and the shape of the conceptual ground upon which the morality of wars and the means of waging them has been theorized has shifted substantially since the first Romans first began to speak of the iustum bellum nearly a millennium before St. Augustine’s own influential writings on the topic.14

#### Highlighting the violence of ongoing drone warfare challenges the status quo narrative of humanitarianism- there is no such thing as just war. The idea that modern warfare has become less violent has been used to silence opposition and legitimize war.

Terrell 13 (Brian Terrell is a co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, Drones and Gadflies, Sept 13, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/13/drones-and-gadflies/)

My own anti-drone activism began with protests at Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada desert in April, 2009. Even some otherwise well informed people were skeptical, back then, that such things were even possible, much less happening daily. Many who were aware accepted the simple and happy narrative of drone warfare as a precise new high-tech system in which soldiers from a safe distance of thousands of miles can pin point those who mean us imminent harm with little or no collateral damage. Even some among our friends in the peace movement questioned the wisdom of focusing attention on drones. Must we protest every new advance in weaponry? Can’t we allow for methods that are at least improvements on indiscriminate carnage? Is not a precisely aimed and delivered drone attack preferable to carpet bombing? Is it not preferable to invasion? Does it make a difference to the victims, in any case, whether there is a pilot in the plane that bombs them or not? The fact that four years later on the day before my release from prison, the president of the United States was defending the use of drones before the country and the world is truly remarkable. This is not a discussion that he or anyone else in the government, politics or the military encouraged or one that the media was anxious to take on. The fact that the issue is up for discussion at all is due to considerable efforts of the few here in the US and the UK in solidarity with many in the streets in Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan protesting this foul weaponry. Communities of protest and resistance in Nevada, New York, California, Missouri, Wisconsin, England and Iowa thrust the issue into local forums, courts and media through creative actions and legal stratagems, effectively demanding that grievance over drone killing be heard. The president’s own speech was itself only rescued from being the cleverly constructed but empty litany of alibi, half-truth and obfuscation that it was intended to be by the interruption by our friend, Medea Benjamin. In his 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., noted that often a society like ours “bogged down in the tragic attempt to live in monologue rather than dialogue,” requires “nonviolent gadflies” in order to “create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal.” As with the issue of segregation 50 years ago, so today the parameters of discussion allowed by politeness and good manners or sanctioned by the police and courts simply cannot abide the objective appraisal of drone warfare that the times require. The discussion such as it is, is made possible only by some who dare speak out of turn, as Medea, or who use their bodies to intrude on the orderly commission of criminalities in our midst. Before the president’s lecture drone warfare’s approval rating was at the top of the polls but a month later drone pilot Col. Bryan Davis of the Ohio Air National Guard noted a turn of the tide. “We are not popular among the American public, every other base has been protested,” he lamented to a local paper. “It doesn’t make you feel warm inside.” The narrative of humanitarian war via drone had begun to unravel in the public eye in the months leading up to the president’s speech and has since fallen further into disrepute. Months before the president made the assertion in his May 23 speech that “by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life,” his administration had already revised earlier claims that the drone programs in Yemen and Pakistan had yielded zero known noncombatant deaths to one death to finally admitting to a death toll in “single digits.” By almost any accounting the noncombatant tolls in those countries have been at least in the hundreds. Just weeks after the president spoke at the National Defense University, a journal published by that institution published a study that debunked his assurance that “conventional airpower and missiles are far less precise than drones, and likely to cause more civilian casualties and local outrage.” Drone strikes in Afghanistan, the study found, were “an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement.” Another assurance given in this speech, that “America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty,” was discredited on June 8 when the US ambassador to Pakistan was summoned by the prime minister of that country angry over a US drone attack that killed nine people. “It was conveyed to the US chargé ď affaires that the government of Pakistan strongly condemns the drone strikes, which are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” said Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs. “The importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes was emphasized.” “We act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people.” Formerly the word “imminent” referred to something about to happen at any moment and using the generally accepted definition of the word one might construe in the president’s words a guarantee that drone strikes are used only to stop “terrorists” engaged in acts that would cause immediate harm to Americans. John Brennan, now director of the CIA, suggested in September 2011 that “a more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’ may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups.” This more flexible understanding of imminence justifies the assassination not only of those caught in the act, but also of targets who are suspected of having written something or said something to make someone think that they might have something to do with an attack on the US someday. A person who is caught on the drones video feed from 7,000 miles away as acting in a manner consistent with someone who might harm one day may now be eliminated as an imminent threat. Referring to the killing of Anwar Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen, the president assured us that “for the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any US citizen — with a drone, or with a shotgun — without due process.” The general usage of the words “due process” would cause the misapprehension that the right of a citizen to have trial by jury before being executed is being reaffirmed here. “This is simply not accurate,” says Attorney General Eric Holder. “‘Due process’ and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.” The burden of “due process” can now be met when the president decides based on secret evidence that a citizen should die. Drone technology is changing our language beyond redefining terms like “imminence” and “due process.” We have progressed, too, beyond Orwellian euphemisms such as naming an intercontinental nuclear missile “Peacekeeper.” These new “hunter-killer platforms” bear names like “Predators” and “Reapers” and may soon be supplanted by “Avengers” and “Stalkers.” The ordinance they deliver is a missile named “Hellfire.” In Iowa where I live, the Air National Guard unit based in Des Moines has replaced its F-16 fighter planes with a Reaper drone control center. This transformation was marked by changing the unit’s name from the “132nd Fighter Wing” to the “132nd Attack Wing.” This change is more than symbolic- a “fight” by definition has two sides and the word implies some kind of parity. There is such a thing as a fair fight (of course the 132nd’s F-16s were used only on all but disarmed populations in places like Iraq and Panama) and a fight usually has some kind of resolution. An “attack” however, is just that. An attack is one-sided, something that a perpetrator inflicts on a victim. A fighter might sometimes be justified, an attacker, never. There is no “just attack” theory. The parsing out of innocent and guilty drone victims is in a sense a waste of time. All alike are victims. George Kennan, might have seen this coming in a policy paper he wrote for the State Department in 1948. In order to preserve the global disparity of wealth post World War II (“We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population”) he suggested that “we should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.” While the speech at the National Defense University was an embarrassment of idealistic slogans, it also used chilling pragmatism to deal with straight power concepts. “For me,” the president said on May 23, “and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live.” Those words had a truer ring a few days later spoken on NBC news by Brandon Bryant, an Air Force drone operator who confessed to being haunted by 1,600 deaths he took part in. Bryant admitted that his actions made him feel like a “heartless sociopath,” and he described one of his first kills, sitting in a chair at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada when his team fired on three men walking down a road in Afghanistan. It was night in Afghanistan, and he remembers watching the thermal image of one victim on his computer screen: “I watch this guy bleed out and, I mean, the blood is hot.” Bryant watched the man die and his image disappear as his body attained the ambient temperature of the ground. “I can see every little pixel, if I just close my eyes.” The remoteness of the drone warrior is no protection from the moral damage of war, and these people are victims as well, and it is on their behalf as well that we protest. We cannot know the hearts of President Obama and those in his inner circle but it is not hard to wonder whether they are truly haunted by the deaths of those killed by drones at their commands. If they may not be haunted by their own consciences, perhaps the responsibility of haunting them falls to us.

#### Just war theory is in the business of legitimizing violence-It controls the conversation and our imagination-Technology and strategy have combined to create a cycle of infinite targets and endless war.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

Swirling in the circularity of the justificans bellum, increasingly aided by developments in artificial intelligence and information technology, whoever is curious as to what just war theory is all about looks in vain for what jus is meant to do when it qualifies war in the first place, or for how it functions in the grammar of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello at all. Just war proponents have held positions in every major military academy, dominated think tanks and policy circles, and written as pundits on whether this or that war has met the appropriate criteria upheld by the tradition for more than a couple of decades. As a result, the moral framework has yielded unanticipated success in the public sphere. Yet it is one thing to weigh the causes and means for waging wars in the framework of just war theory, and another to be in the business of justifying wars, strategies, tactics, and new technologies. One may entertain informed suspicions, but evaluation of the huge outpouring of just war argumentation appearing in the last three or four decades might help decide the question of whether the enterprise has been fundamentally about the justification of wars, or about whatever it means to constrain violence by subjection of such things to moral scrutiny - ironically, a task for which data mining technologies might prove immensely helpful. Something is amiss when a moral tradition that understands itself to have been formed by an appeal to moral restraint in the declaring and waging of wars now finds itself in becoming an ethics panel writ large for politicians, policy makers, military strategists, and makers of military hardware. In reality, it seems to be about experts advancing a strategic objective as far as is possible before the just warriors intervene and stop them just short of crossing the line dividing morally permissible from morally culpable action. The boundary is sufficiently flexible to permit the ethics panelists to empower the soldier to approach that line more closely than might have otherwise been the case. Consequently, the circle of legitimate means for fighting a war just got enlarged, and the fighting of it just got escalated. The argument for restraint only works when a proposed very real, concrete action is contrasted with an imagined outcome weighed out as an inevitability. The upshot is that just warriors now find themselves more than ever in the business of establishing the outer moral limit of wars and means for waging them by imagining the boundaries for an imaginary war. Conceptual claims about what technology can and cannot do have not only been shallow and ill-conceived, they enable the next round of technology to scale up the range of possibilities for fighting wars dangerously close to crossing the moral border markers. Smart bombs are no more an innovation fostering moral discrimination any more than rifled barrels for firearms did in the century before the last. The question hardly needs to be raised whether more people have died from rifles and modern propellants than black powder muskets. The concentration of lethal power, along with new and transformative technologies for wielding it, in the hands of an intelligence-based regime appears to be not simply the brute necessity of waging a war on terror at the behest of humanitarian intervention, nor simply the extension of the analogy of self-defense to preposterous lengths. It is the formation of a new approach to foreign policy underwritten by a new way of fighting a potentially perpetual war against threats to the interests of the United States in which the use of covert and secretive lethal force is the new preferred means for sustaining it. Ironically, if just war theory has always been a theory of sovereignty, and its immediate history has been underwritten by notions of the sovereign nation-state, then it also becomes apparent that the new case for perpetual war for the sake of perpetual peace is much closer than realized to a frankly postmodern project predicated on the collapse of sovereignty invested in the modern nation state. Clandestine drone wars wreak havoc upon the legacy of Westphalia. They have ceased to be remotely related to Kant’s prescriptions for perpetual peace upon which just warriors have relied for over two centuries. A war without borders against persons with no national identity is not a modern war. It is a consequence of the failure of modern wars to deal with the problems that have haunted the modern project, and those are about religious more than national or ethnic identities. The drone program, according to Obama and his subordinates, is here to stay, and the technologies that have enabled it are likewise set to transform the American way of war into something that war has never before been. The reach of technologically enabled covert operations is now theoretically infinite when abstracted from the constraints of having intelligence or special operations forces on the ground. The range of targets is theoretically endless and how they are singled out and on what basis they are targeted will only a select few be privy to. New data and computational capacities may mean that no one really knows those bases at all. Hence the response to the perceived infinity of evil presenting as terrorism is the infinite reach of lethal force, and an infinite war posture to sustain it. The dilemma associated with contemporary wars, which frame religion in the modern world as collared and leashed by the demands of secularity and modernity, is that for a good many people of faith the notion of God’s sovereignty ultimately implies that only God is worth killing for. It is not evident that such a view furthers violence more than whatever is enabled by the natural right to self-defense and its legal analogs - especially in a time of war. At the very least it would prohibit the now accepted and legally justified practice of killing over theft or threats to private property, and it might make exclusive national control over global resources untenable. It may be that in wars in defense of national interests everything that has drawn geographical borders around the concept of sovereignty have proven to be the impultrix violentia of contemporary warfare in ways that belie the modern presumption to have solved endemic religious violence through politics. There is good historical evidence for the suspicion that religions may be better prepared to form wise men who love peace than the modern state. The suspicion itself cannot be contained in a context presumed to have been secularized long ago. It instead indicates that religion in the modern globalized world will find means of negotiation with the demands of all kinds of societies in all kinds of places other than those that enforce privatization of religious sensibilities and commitments, which is precisely the modern project. To the extent just war theory cannot freely concede that “religious extremism” - the conflict between global and globalizing religions and the shape of the nation-state - is in essence the primary moral and political problem it addresses , it betrays its own profound existential crisis, and ceases to become relevant any longer in today’s world. That world is now shaped by perpetual wars against infinite targets in infinite places with the hubris of infinite power relentlessly driven by the technological imagination. It is no longer difficult to imagine a future in which critics of a previous generation’s investment in the “archaic” theory of just and unjust wars are merely proclaiming the obvious.

#### Highlighting the issue of drone warfare is a useful starting point for a larger interrogation of State killing-Exposing the history of targeted killing is an important mechanism for challenging the secret global war on terrorism.

Noble 12 (Doug, activist with the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Assassination Nation, July 19, http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/07/19/assassination-nation/)

This striking new transparency, the official acknowledgment for the first time of a broad-based US assassination and targeted killing program, has resulted from the unprecedented and controversial visibility of drone warfare. Drones now make news every day, and those of us who have been protesting their use for years have heightened their visibility in the public eye, forcing official acknowledgment and fostering worldwide scrutiny. This new scrutiny focuses not only on drone use but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the targeted killing itself – and the “kill lists” that make them possible. This new exposure has set off a firestorm of reaction around the globe. Chris Woods of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism told Democracy Now! “The kill list got really heavy coverage … newspapers have all expressed significant concern about the existence of the kill list, the idea of this level of executive power.” [5] A Washington Post editorial noted that “No president has ever relied so extensively on the secret killing of individuals to advance the nation’s security goals.” [6] Becker and Shane of the Times pronounced Obama’s role “without precedent in presidential history, of personally overseeing the shadow war …” [7] And former president Jimmy Carter insisted, in a recent editorial in The New York Times, “We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these [drone] attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times.” [8] Really? In fact, US assassination and targeted killing, with presidential approval, has been going on covertly for at least half a century. Ironically, all this drone killing now offers us a new opportunity: to pry open the Pandora’s box hiding long-held secrets of covert US assassination and targeted killing, and to expose them to the light of day. What we would find is that the only things new in the latest, more publicized revelations about kill lists and assassinations are the use of drones, the president’s hands-on approach in vetting targets, and the global scope of the drone killing. Those of us in the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Code Pink and other groups protesting US drones for years have correctly focused on the use of drones as illegal, immoral and strategically counterproductive. We have abhorred the schizophrenic ease of remote killing, the uniquely frightening horror of a drone strike, and the unavoidable (even intentional) killing of countless civilian “terrorist suspects” in “signature strikes.” We have also warned of the proliferation of drones in countries around the globe and of their procurement by US police forces and border patrols, for surveillance and “non-lethal” targeting. But drones are not the only, or even the most important, concern. It’s the targeted killing itself, past and present. In this article I start to unravel what the latest demands for transparency should lead us to investigate fully: the fifty year history of US assassination and targeted killing that has resulted, quite directly, in the present moment. Those who are mortified by the latest revelations of Obama’s kill list have much to learn from a more comprehensive, historical perspective on US killing around the globe. Who knows: Perhaps someone in Congress might even be prodded to do what Senators Fulbright and Church did in years past: hold hearings on this continuing execration taking place in our name. Until then, what follows is an introduction to this ongoing horror story. Section 1 of this article briefly reviews the lethal history of the US Phoenix Program in Vietnam, the original source of subsequent US counter terrorist tactics and strategies. Section 2 revisits briefly the well-worn history of US kill lists and assassinations in Latin American countries, followed by the somewhat less-well-known history of US kill lists and assassinations in countries on other continents. Section 3 traces the direct legacy of Phoenix, even its explicit resurrection by the key architects of the US targeted killing programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in a growing number of “countries we are not at war with.” One point of clarification and definition. It is well known that in recent history the US has orchestrated assassination attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, on major world leaders. Examples include: Lumumba under Eisenhower, Castro and Diem under Kennedy, Gaddhafi under Reagan, Saddam Hussein under Bush, and Allende under Nixon. [9] The term “assassination” is typically restricted to such killings of political leaders, and President Ford’s executive order banning assassination applies only to the assassination of foreign heads of state. [10] The focus of this article is different. Here we discuss the US-generated kill lists used over the last half century, under direct presidential authority, for the targeted killing of thousands of civilians suspected of being or harboring terrorists/ insurgents, from Vietnam to Guatemala, from Indonesia to Iraq, right up to the present day. The Phoenix Program The US Phoenix Program was a secret, large scale counter terrorist effort in Vietnam. Developed in 1967 by the CIA, the Phoenix Program, called Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, aimed a concerted effort to “neutralize” the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI) consisting of South Vietnamese civilians suspected of supporting North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers. The euphemism “neutralize” meant to kill or detain indefinitely. Then CIA Director William Colby, while insisting in 1971 Congressional hearings that “the Phoenix program is not a program of assassination,” nonetheless conceded that Phoenix operations killed over 20,000 people between 1967 and 1972. [11] Phoenix targeted civilians, not soldiers. Operations were carried out by “hunter-killer teams” consisting both of US Green Berets and Navy Seals and by South Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), units of mercenaries set up for assassination and “counter terror.” A Newsweek article in January 1970 described Phoenix as “a highly secret and unconventional operation that counters VC terror with terror of its own.” [12] Robert Kaiser of the Washington Post reported Phoenix being called “an instrument of mass political murder…sort of Vietnamese Murder Inc.,” designed to terrorize the civilian population into submission.” [13] Until 1970 the computerized VCI blacklist was a unilateral American operation. After the devastating 1968 Tet offensive, South Vietnamese President Thieu declared: “The VCI must be eliminated…and will be defeated by the Phoenix program.” [14] Phoenix became a ruthless “bounty hunting” program to eliminate the opposition. [15] The US and South Vietnamese created a list of tens of thousands of suspects for assassination. These names were centralized and distributed to Phoenix coordinators. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked for assassination. The program for 1969 called for “neutralizing” 1800 a month. The VCI blacklist became corrupted by officers inserting their personal enemies’ names to get even. Due process was nonexistent. Names supplied by anonymous informers showed up on blacklists. [16] CIA Director Colby admitted in 1971 that the blacklists had been “inaccurate.” [17] Few senior VCI leaders were caught in the Phoenix net. Instead its victims were typically innocent civilians. A Pentagon-contract study found that, between 1970 and 1971, ninety-seven per cent of the Vietcong targeted by the Phoenix Program were of negligible importance. [18] By 1973, Phoenix generated 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Military operations such as My Lai used Phoenix intelligence; in fact, the My Lai massacre, hardly an isolated incident, was itself a Phoenix operation. [19] Apologists have offered rationales for Phoenix that sound eerily similar to those used to defend current drone attacks. Phoenix was typically referred to as a “scalpel” replacing the “bludgeon” of search and destroy, aerial bombardment or artillery barrages. Alternatively, it was called a precision “rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders … and activists in VCI.” [20] Military historian Dale Andrade explains, “Both SEALS and PRUs killed many VCI guerrillas – that was war. They also inevitably killed innocent civilians – that was regrettable….but [Phoenix] operations were much more discerning than the massive affairs launched by conventional …forces. That fact was often lost in the rhetoric of assassination and murder …”[21] Phoenix was created, organized, and funded by the CIA. Quotas were set by Americans. Informers were paid with US funds. The national system of identifying suspects, the elaboration of numerical goals and their use as measures of merit, was designed and funded by Americans. One former US Phoenix soldier conceded, “It was “heinous,” far worse than the things attributed to it.” [22] Kill Lists from Phoenix to Latin America The US intelligence community formalized the lessons of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam by commissioning Project X, the Army’s top-secret program for transmitting Vietnam’s lessons to South America. [23] By the mid-1970s, the Project X materials were going to armies all over the world. These were textbooks for global counterinsurgency and terror warfare. These included a murder manual, “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare,” which openly instructed in the assassination of public officials, and was distributed to the Nicaraguan Contras. Another manual, “Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual,” was used widely in Honduran counterrorism efforts. Use of the Project X material was temporarily suspended by Congress and the Carter administration for probable human rights violations, but the program was restored by the Reagan administration in 1982. By the mid-1980s, according to one detailed history, “counterguerrilla operations in Colombia and Central America would thus bear an eerie but explicable resemblance to South Vietnam.” [24] What follows is a brief sketch of the widespread application of US-promulgated Phoenix-derived reigns of terror, kill lists, and death squads throughout Latin America and beyond. Much of this is familiar territory to many activists and scholars, and is merely the tip of the iceberg, but it merits review as a backdrop for the current context of kill lists and targeted assassination. [25] US KILL LISTS AND ASSASSINATION IN LATIN AMERICA The U.S. Army’s School of Americas (SOA), started in 1946, trained mass murderers and orchestrated coups in Peru, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico. The SOA trained more than 61,000 Latin American officers implicated in widespread slaughter of civilian populations across Latin America. From 1966-1976 the SOA trained hundreds of Latin American officers in Phoenix-derived methods. Between 1989-1991 the SOA issued almost 700 copies of Project X handbooks to at least ten Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2001, SOA was renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC), but peace activists know it as School of Assassins. [26] The CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in Mexico, the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in Brazil. In South America, in 1970-79, Operation Condor, the code-name for collection, exchange and storage of intelligence, was established among intelligence services in South America to eradicate Marxist activities. Operation Condor promoted joint operations including assassination against targets in member countries. In Central America, the CIA-supported death toll under the Reagan presidency alone exceeded 150,000. The CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala (Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). Honduran death squads were active through the 1980s, the most infamous of which was Battalion 3–16, which assassinated hundreds of people, including teachers, politicians, and union leaders. Battalion 316 received substantial CIA support and training, and at least 19 members graduated from the School of the Americas. In Colombia, about 20,000 people were killed since 1986 and much of U.S. aid for counternarcotics was diverted to what Amnesty International labeled “one of the worst killing fields.” The US State Department also supported the Colombian army in creating a database of subversives, terrorists and drug dealers. In Bolivia, Amnesty International reported that from 1966-68 between 3,000 and 8,000 people were killed by death squads. The CIA supplied names of U.S. and other foreign missionaries and progressive priests. In Ecuador, the CIA maintained what was called the lynx list, aka the subversive control watch list of the most important left-wing activists to arrest. In Uruguay. Every CIA station maintained a subversive control watch list of most important left wing activists. From 1970-72 the CIA helped set up the Department of Information and Intelligence (DII), which served as a cover for death squads, and also co-ordinated meetings between Brazilian and Uruguayan death squads. In Nicaragua, the US provided illegal funds to the Contras, and Marine intelligence helped maintain a list of civilians marked for assassination when Contra forces entered the country. In Chile, 1970-73, CIA-created unions organized CIA-financed strikes leading to Allende’s overthrow and subsequent suicide. By late 1971 the CIA was involved in the preparation of lists of nearly 20,000 middle-level leaders of people’s organizations, scheduled to be assassinated after the Pinochet coup. In Haiti, U.S. officials with CIA backgrounds in Phoenix-like program activities coordinated with the Ton-Ton Macoute, “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s private death squad, responsible for killing at least 3,000 people. For over thirty years the US military and the CIA helped organize, train, and fund death squad activity in El Salvador. From 1980-93, at least 63,000 Salvadoran civilians were killed, mostly by the government directly supported by the U.S. The CIA routinely supplied ANSESAL, the security forces, and the general staff with electronic, photographic, and personal surveillance of suspected dissidents and Salvadorans abroad who were later assassinated by death squads. US militray involvement in El Salvador allowed “the lessons learned in Vietnam to be put into practice … assisting an allied country in counterinsurgency operations.” [27] In Guatemala, as early as 1954, the U.S. Ambassador, after the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of the Arbenz government, gave to the new Armas government lists of radical opponents to be assassinated. Years later, throughout Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, Washington continuously to supported the Guatemalan military’s excesses against civilians, which killed 200,000 people. US Assassination Programs Exported to Other Countries In Indonesia, 1965-66, the US embassy and the CIA provided the Indonesian military with lists of the names of PKI militants, which were used by Suharto to crush the PKI regime. This resulted in “one of the worst episodes of mass murder of the twentieth century,” with estimates as high as one million deaths. [28] In Thailand, in 1976, the new junta used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during coup; two right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied directly to CIA operations. In Iran, the CIA launched a coup installing the shah in power and helped establish the lethal secret police unit SAVAK. [29] The CIA and SAVAK then exchanged intelligence, including information and arrest lists on the communist Tudeh party. Years later, in 1983, the CIA gave the Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran, which the Khomeni regime used to execute 200 suspects and close down the communist Tudeh party. In the Philippines, in 1986, Reagan increased CIA involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency operations, carried out by more than 50 death squads. In 2001, before 9/11, the Bush administration sent a unit of SOF to the Philippines “to help train Philippine counter terrorist forces fighting against Muslim separatists” within groups like Abu Sayyaf. After 9/11 US-Filipino cooperation was stepped up and the ongoing separatist conflict was cast, to the benefit of both sides, as “the second front in the war on terror.”[30] In Feb, 2012, a US drone strike targeting leaders of Abu Sayyaf and other separatist groups killed 15 people, the first use of killer drones in Southeast Asia. [31] A “global Phoenix Program”: drone targets worldwide “A global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism.” –David Kilcullen [32] IRAQ Despite the US-perpetrated counter terrorist slaughter in Latin America and elsewhere in the 1970s-1990s, the US Special Forces debacle in Mogadishu in 1993, popularized in the film Black Hawk Down, severely impacted US willingness to use Special Forces in counter terrorist missions for the next decade. But then, after 9/11, things changed drastically. On September 17, 2001, President Bush signed a secret Presidential finding authorizing the C.I.A. to create paramilitary teams to hunt, capture, detain, or kill designated terrorists almost anywhere in the world. The pressure from the White House, in particular from Vice-President Dick Cheney, was intense, and in the scramble, a search of the C.I.A.’s archives turned up – the Phoenix Program. [33] In July , 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent an order for a plan to make sure that special forces could be authorized to use lethal force ‘in minutes and hours, not days and weeks.’” [34] Rumsfeld prompted Bush to authorize the military to “find and finish” terrorist targets. Here he was referring to “the F3EA targeting cycle” used in anti-infrastructure operations by Special Operations Forces. F3EA, an abbreviation of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, utilizes comprehensive intelligence to “find a target amidst civilian clutter and fix his exact location . . . . enabling surgical finish operations … to catch a fleeting target.” [35] Lt General William (Jerry) Boykin, Delta commander in Mogadishu, deputy undersecretary for Defense for Intelligence and a key planner of the Special Forces offensive in Iraq, announced, “We’re going after these people. Killing or capturing them … doing what the Phoenix program was designed to do, without all the secrecy.” [36] Back in 1963, the CIA had supplied lists of communists to the Baath party coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated. [37] Now, forty years later, it was the Baathists’ turn to be rounded up by Special Forces and CIA and executed. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military notoriously developed a set of playing cards to help troops identify the most-wanted members of Saddam Hussein‘s government, mostly high-ranking Baath Party members. Less well-known was the secret targeted killing of thousands of Baathist civilians by US Special Forces. Seymour Hersh wrote in 2003 that “The Bush Administration authorized a major escalation of the Special Forces covert war in Iraq. … Its highest priority [being] the neutralization of the Baathist insurgents, by capture or assassination. [38] A former C.I.A. station chief described the strategy: “The only way we can win is to go unconventional. We’re going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We’ve got to scare the Iraqis into submission.” [39] The US even hired thousands of contract killers previously responsible for US-sponsored extra-judicial killings and death squad activity in Latin America. The operation—called “preëmptive manhunting” by one Pentagon adviser—had, according to Hersh, “the potential to turn into another Phoenix Program.” [40] Global Phoenix In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored a paper by the National Defense Research Institute entitled “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency.” The paper notes, “The persistent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated fresh interest among military officers, policymakers, and civilian analysts in the history of counterinsurgency. The Phoenix Program in Vietnam—the U.S. effort to improve intelligence coordination and operations aimed at identifying and dismantling the communist underground—is the subject of much renewed attention.” [41] The paper continues, “As the United States and its allies shift their focus to Afghanistan and weigh counterinsurgency alternatives for that country, decisionmakers would be wise to consider how Phoenix-style approaches might serve to pry open Taliban and Al-Qaeda black boxes.” [42] Two key architects of the current Phoenix-style global counterinsurgency efforts by the US are David Kilcullen and Michael Vickers. David Kilcullen has been counterinsurgency advisor to two former Middle East commanders, General Stanley McChrystal (formerly head of Special Operations) and General David Petraeus, now CIA Director. Michael G. Vickers, made famous in the book and film Charlie Wilson’s War about the CIA’s anti-Soviet Afghan campaign of the 1980s, is currently Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, wielding such vast authority over the US war on terror that, according to a Washington Post profile, Pentagon colleagues refer to as his “take-over-the-world-plan.” [43] Kilcullen wrote in a much-quoted 2004 paper entitled “Countering Global Insurgency” that “Counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have reawakened official and analytical interest in the Phoenix Program.” He proposed that “a global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism,” one which would focus on “interdicting links … between jihad theatres, denying sanctuary areas, … isolating Islamists from local populations and … disrupting inputs” from others. [44] Vickers issued a Phoenix-style directive in December 2008 to “develop capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low visibility operations.” “It’s not just the Middle East. It’s not just the developing world. It’s not just non-democratic countries – it’s a global problem. Threats can emanate from Denmark, the United Kingdom, you name it.” [45] According to a Washington Post profile, “the most critical aspect of Vicker’s plan targeting al-Qaeda-affiliated networks around the world involves US Special Forces working through foreign partners to uproot and fight terrorism.” [46] US military and Special Operations forces would “pay indigenous fighters and paramilitaries who work with them in gathering intelligence, hunting terrorists, fomenting guerrilla warfare or putting down an insurgency.” [47] Pentagon colleagues have said of Vickers, “he tends to think like a gangster.” [48] Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell revealed that getting Bin Laden in Pakistan was Vicker’s “baby,” and “more than anyone else in the department, he drove the issue.” [49] 2011 New York Times Vickers summarizes his strategy this: “You make a deal with the devil to defeat another devil.”[50] “I just want to kill those guys.” [51] A 2011 Such is the megalomaniacal mission underlying the US global war on terror, its kill lists and worldwide program of targeted assassination. Killer Drones Revisited “Engaging in any assassination blurs the line between the good guys and the bad.” It is also “a proclamation of weakness and an admission of failure.” –John Jacob Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops [52] The purpose of this article is to reframe the current attention on killer drones and Obama’s “kill list” within an historical perspective. The goal here is not to discourage the escalating protest against killer drones or against Obama’s targeted assassination program around the globe. As stated at the outset, the unprecedented visibility of these nefarious activities and of the outraged public response to them is precisely what is needed at this time. This heightened awareness also affords a perfect opportunity to revisit the extraordinary history of US assassination and targeted killing that has led directly and explicitly to these activities. Focus on the drones alone will not be sufficient. For even the major counter terrorist mastermind David Kilcullen himself, an avid proponent of the global targeted killing program, has argued against the use of drones. In a 2009 New York Times editorial he argues that “The goal should be to isolate extremists from their communities; [they] must be defeated by indigenous forces…Drone strikes make this harder, not easier.” He adds, “The use of drones displays every characteristic of a tactic – or, more accurately, a piece of technology – substituting for a strategy, [with minimal understanding] of the tribal dynamics of the local population. This creates public outrage and a desire for revenge.” [53] Scholar Maria Ryan, in a 2011 article entitled “War in Countries We Are Not at War With,” writes: “In 2006 the Pentagon announced that it had sent small teams of Special Operations troops to US embassies to gather intelligence on terrorism in Africa, South East Asia and South America…There is, then, a covert side to the Global War on Terrorism that is not visible and not currently knowable in the absence of whistleblowers, leaks, or things gone wrong.” [54] The heightened public attention paid to drone killing might very well, in time, lead to some welcome success in curtailing their use. But too narrow a focus on the US deployment of Predator and Reaper drones might also distract us from other forms of Phoenix-derived targeted killing still being perpetrated globally – and covertly – by our Assassination Nation.

#### This infinite war will culminate in planetary extinction.

Hanrahan 11 (Clare, Militarism and the "Economics of Extinction," http://warisacrime.org/content/militarism-and-economics-extinction

War is an all out assault on life. Every living being is in peril. The interrelated systems that sustain life are approaching total collapse from resource depletion, wanton killing and the environmental degradation of centuries of senseless war. The single most egregious and unrelenting source of ecocide is the Pentagon, an agency that consumes nearly 50 percent of each U.S. tax dollar extorted from the workers in the name of national defense. More than fifty years ago U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that "the problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without." We have gone way too far—beyond the limits of law, morality and of sane self interest. With the Pentagon's practices of obfuscation and denial, it is a daunting task to uncover and document the staggering facts of just how severe—and in some instances irreversible—is the ecological damage brought on by militarism. What is known of the grim statistics is a stunning indictment of the woefully misnamed Department of Defense. How did this happen? What is the extent of the poisoning? Who will clean up the mess? Is it too late to turn this around? Warfare has never been easy on the earth, yet throughout thousands of years of recorded military history, this living planet has managed to recover and adjust to a succession of trampling armies encroaching with roads, leveling forests, damming rivers, polluting the air, the soil and water, digging entrenchments, bombarding and poisoning the lands, destroying habitat and crops, ~~raping~~, pillaging and eliminating uncounted species of plants and animals. The human cost in war has also been high but in past centuries was limited mostly to combatants. That is no longer the reality. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated in the 1990s that civilian deaths constituted 90 percent of all deaths in war. In recent decades more children have been killed than soldiers and more deaths occur after the battlefield is abandoned than during combat. In almost every U.S. community where the Department of Defense and its corporate military contractors employ millions in the production, maintenance, and storage of "conventional," chemical, and nuclear weapons, the health of the workers and the natural environment is sacrificed. According to a 1989 US General Accounting Office report, the US Military produces more than 400,000 tons of hazardous waste each year. That figure is most certainly a low estimate. With astounding obedience, We the People have been willing to relinquish our lives, our children's lives, our values and the very survival of the earth in the name of national security. In 1942, the 3,000 residents of five rural Tennessee mountain communities were given just a few weeks' notice to vacate their homes and ancestral farms. Thus was the "secret city" of Oak Ridge established, and the 60,000 acres of Tennessee valleys and ridges expropriated for the war effort. The Manhattan Project was developed to enrich the uranium used for the Hiroshima bomb. In subsequent decades, and in the name of national security, officials knowingly subjected atomic industry workers, soldiers and nearby residents to deadly doses of radiation at nuclear sites throughout the country. "Some 300,000 people, or half of those who ever worked in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, are believed to have been affected by exposure to radiation," asserts Michael Renner, of the World Watch Institute writing in the 1997 book War and Public Health. Every step of the nuclear bomb-making process involves severe environmental contamination that lingers for generations. "Of all the different ways in which military operations have an impact on human health and the environment, nuclear weapons production and testing is the most severe and enduring," Renner says. As a result of naval accidents there are at least 50 nuclear warheads and 11 nuclear reactors littering the ocean floor. Some researchers estimate that the radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests have already caused as many as 86,000 birth defects and 150,000 premature deaths. Two million more cancer deaths may yet ensue from the now-banned above ground explosions. Despite the horrific consequences of nuclear energy, in Oak Ridge today, the Obama administration has approved an additional 7.5 billion dollars for refurbishing the next generation of thermonuclear weapons, assuring a stockpile of death for generations to come. The unprecedented atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, murdering hundreds of thousands, pales in comparison to the impact of modern weapons of mass destruction. Militarism in this atomic age has developed and used weapons so heinous as to extend the murderous reach to all future generations. After more than 60 years producing atomic weapons and nuclear energy, the Department of Defense and Department of Energy have accumulated over 500,000 tons of so-called depleted uranium, which it offers free of charge to weapons makers throughout the world. In Jonesborough, Tennessee, down a quiet country lane in the heart of the Southern Appalachian Mountains, Aerojet Ordnance employs a small workforce to produce weaponized uranium armaments. Bullets are coated with the radioactive waste from enriching U-235 to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and atomic bombs. According to investigative reporter Bob Nichols, writing in 2010 for the San Francisco Bay View, Iraq and virtually all the rest of the Middle East and Central Asia has been continually dosed for almost 20 years with thousands of tons of weaponized ceramic uranium oxide gas, also known as depleted uranium." These bullets, shells and bombs, when exploded, reach temperatures over 3,000 degrees centigrade and become a lethal uranium aerosol that "never stops indiscriminately maiming and killing." The contamination persists for billions of years, both on the battlefield and at US manufacturing and storage sites. Research has confirmed that uranium oxide (UO) particles, when inhaled, migrate up the olfactory nerve to the brain. They are so small they can even enter the body through the skindestroying cells in the brains, bones, and testicles or ovaries of anyone contaminated with the radioactive particles—friend, foe or noncombatant. In addition to the horrific crimes of authorizing, producing and deploying weaponized uranium, the U.S. military's lethal footprint around the globe includes toxins from heavy metals, dioxins, PCB's, asbestos, mustard, sarin and nerve gas, as well as other chemical and biological weapons. And scattered on battlefields throughout the world are as many as 100 million unexploded antipersonnel land mines. Eighty percent of landmine victims have been noncombatants. In Viet Nam, from 1962 to 1970, the US military engaged in chemical warfare dousing the country with 19 million gallons of herbicides, mostly Agent Orange produced by Monsanto, Dow Chemical and other U.S. manufacturers. The dioxin rich chemicals contaminated about five million acres of farmland, forest and waters. At least one million Vietnamese people and more than 100,000 Americans and allied troops were poisoned with deadly effects that have continued into the third generation. The human and environmental devastation in Central American during the US proxy wars of the 1980s is yet another horrific chapter in the tragedy of US militarism. In the United States alone, the Pentagon is responsible for at least 25,000 contaminated properties in all 50 states, according to a 2008 Washington Post report. Nine hundred abandoned military bases, weapons manufacturing and testing sites and other military-related industries are listed on the Environmental Protection Agency's list of 1,300 sites most hazardous to human and ecological health, and that is only a portion of the polluted sites. As many as 20 million Americans in 43 states drink water contaminated by cancer-causing perchlorate, a carcinogen found in missile and rocket fuel. According to a 1991 edition of Rachel's hazardous Waste news (#224), "… the military has exposed thousands (perhaps millions) of innocent Americans to deadly amounts of radioactivity and to a witch's brew of potent chemical toxins, has covered up these facts, has lied to the victims and their families, has lied to the press, has lied to Congress. It is a scandal and an outrage on such a scale that it takes your breath away." In 2011 it is still hard to catch one's breath in the face of this ongoing and intentional assault on the earth. And of course, it is not just the Pentagon with its lethal global reach, but the insidious corporate/government alliance that Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of over fifty years ago— a crime syndicate that colludes to profit from and deny responsibility for planetary ecocide. Gaia isn't bound by national borders, nor is this distressed planet protected by the false distinctions militarists make between combat zones and the lands they claim to defend. The militarists and the scientists in their employ have reached into the very heavens to harness the energies of the ionosphere in the service of war. Dr. Rosalie Bertell, a scientist and Roman Catholic nun confirms that "US military scientists are working on weather systems as a potential weapon. The methods include the enhancing of storms and the diverting of vapor rivers in the Earth's atmosphere to produce targeted droughts or floods." The US military practiced this so-called "geophysical warfare" in Viet Nam with Project Skyfire and Project Stormfury. Now the Pentagon is arrogantly pursuing what it calls "full spectrum" US military domination. Dr. Bertell has written of military experiments that may have played a part in earthquakes and unusual weather conditions and even accelerated global warming. Current military projects such as HAARP (High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program) are part of a "growing chain of astonishingly powerful, and potentially interactive, military installations, using varied types of electromagnetic fields or wavelengths, each with a different ability to affect the earth or its atmosphere," according to Dr. Bertell. Is there no end to the arrogance? We must intervene. We must put a stop to the militarism characterized by Academy of Natural Sciences writer Roland Wall as "a direct and relentless assault on human and natural ecosystems." The Department of Defense uses 360,000 barrels of oil each day. This amount makes the DoD the single largest oil consumer in the world. According to Sharon E. Burke, the Pentagon's director of operational energy plans and programs, the Defense Logistics Agency delivers more than 170,000 barrels of oil each day to the war theaters, at a cost of $9.6 billion in 2010. Climate change activists, rightly concerned about the continued use of fossil fuels to power our insatiable energy demands, have taken to the streets of Washington, DC to call for a halt to the tar sands oil pipeline, other resisters march in the hundreds to the sites of mountain top removal coal mining, or stand in resistance at the nuclear weapons and nuclear power complexes throughout the nation. Arrests, fines, jail and imprisonment is the lot of many who take a bold stand to call an end to the US military industrial choke hold on the planet. But a strategically disastrous divide persists between activists in the environmental sustainability movements and war resisters who challenge more directly the militarism that is the largest single cause of the Earth's imminent collapse. Have we blindly accepted the paradigm that war is inevitable, that violence is intrinsic to our nature, and that our security depends on a strong military? It is a lie—repeated again and again—but it is still a lie. "Challenging the destruction and damage to the environment and the massive exploitation of oil and metal resources for the military-industrial war machine must become paramount in the work for peace," scientist and author H. Patricia Hynes writes in a recent series of articles on the environmental impact of US militarism. Indeed, as the United Nations asserts, "there can be no durable peace if the natural resources that sustain livelihoods and ecosystems are destroyed." "We don't know how to extricate ourselves from our complicity very surely or very soon," Poet and social critic Wendell Berry asserts. "How could we live without the war economy and the holocaust of the fossil fuels?" We must find the answer to our deadly dilemma and put an end to our complicity in the desecration of the world and destruction of all creation. "To the offer of more abundant life," Berry writes, "we have chosen to respond with the economics of extinction." We cannot let this be the end.

#### The impact is a perpetual state of war

Dabashi 2007

Hamid, Thinking beyond the US invasion of Iran, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/831/focus.htm

More than being at war, what works best for the US/Israeli warlords is being in "a state of war" -- for the fear of war is the best condition in which they want to keep the world. Come March, April, May or whenever, US/Israel may or may not, invade Iran. If the war indeed happens, no one will count the Iranian dead, for counting them will amount to no moral outrage loud enough to match what is happening to the world. CNN will count the US soldiers' casualties, but even this, too, will dissipate into a vacuous pomposity that could not care less about the poor and disenfranchised Americans who are grabbed by the throat of their poverty, and catapulted half way around the globe to maim, murder, torture, and rape their own brothers and sisters. For every one US casualty (which is one too many) there will be anywhere between one to two hundred Iranian casualties, if we were to take the Iraqi case as our measure. No one will hold anyone responsible. The Iranian neo-con contingency will have made their career and lucrative contracts, and still appear on television. Just like Fouad Ajami, they will tell Americans that these Iranians, just like Iraqis, did not deserve the gift of freedom and democracy that the Americans were offering them (as he proposes in his new book The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq ). The rest of the world will have gotten even more used to the state of war that US/Israel is imposing on the globe. The invasion of Iran will add yet another front to the US/Israeli global flexing of its military prowess. And if they -- the US government and Jewish state (the two most violent states on planet Earth) -- don't invade Iran, it still makes no difference. All it takes is a comment here by President Bush, or a suggestion there by Vice President Cheney, or yet another confession that Israel makes that it indeed has massive nuclear capacities -- or else planting of a news story that Israel may attack Iran. The actual context of these news, that the US/Israel may or may not attack Iran, is entirely irrelevant to the reality of positing these threats. It is this that keeps the world on the edge of its seat, making fear and warmongering the paramount condition of our lives. In his groundbreaking work on the "state of exception", the distinguished Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has begun the uncanny task of theorising what has hitherto been delegated to the realm of necessities legem non habet ("necessity has no law"). Defying this dictum, Agamben has taken Karl Schmitt's famous pronouncement in his Political Theology (that the sovereign is "he who decides on the state of exception") quite seriously and sought to theorise that state of exception. In Agamben's own project, what he calls the "no- man's land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life" remains paramount. But adjacent to that effectively juridical project, there remains a widespread culture of catastrophe that must systematically generate and sustain that state of exception, which here and now in the United States, and the world it ruthlessly rules, amounts to a perpetual state of war. It is to that state, and not merely its potential and actual evidence, that we must learn how to respond.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should abolish the authority to engage in targeted killing.

### Contention Two-Moving Past Just War

#### Just war theory is an obstacle to new ways of understanding and relating to the world-The focus on asking WHICH WARS, forecloses the possibility of asking IF WAR? The 1AC encourages us to move beyond the narrow debates over morality and legality and onto a broader focus that can start to challenge structural violence.

#### Militarism is process; exposing its hidden circuits of imperial violence is critical to demystifying its hegemony; the affirmatives moment of interruption is a breakaway from the paranoia that current governs national security policy.

McClintock 9 (Anne, is a Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, “Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib,” Project Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11 The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution. —C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians” The barbarians have declared war. —President George W. Bush C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

#### The vocabulary of just war has become a permission slip in public debates to sanction international conflicts---exposing its inherent moral contradictions in public debates---it must be examined

Moore 01 (Thomas, An Australian Approach to ethic warfare?, War, Ethics and Justice: New Perspectives on a Post-9/11 World, google books, pg39)

The revival of just war theory in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States reveals the contradictory and contested nature of moral claims about violence within International Relations. If political scientists are often criticised for "fiddling while Rome burns' (Strauss 1962: 327) then the extensive revival of just war theory in public debates about armed intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of moral reasoning in public deliberation about warfare and violence in International Relations. The extensive deployment of just war theory in the global war on terror raises signi- ficant questions about the contradictory relationship between political practice and political theory within the just war tradition. The strength of the just war tra-dition lies in its capacity to generate an understanding of the communitarian basis of modem militaries and how decisions about warfare are questions for deliberation within political community. Nonetheless, this instrumental view of just war theory thinks of just war as a rational body of conditions that must be satisfied in order to go to war (jus ad bellum) and in the fighting of war (jus in bello) This chapter examines the way in which parliamentary debate about the Iraqi intervention highlights the limitations of the just war theory as a public dis- course of warfare. A failure to examine the 'difficult questions' of just war theory within the official discourse of Australian foreign policy have revealed how the vocabulary of the just war tradition has become a 'permission slip’ for states in justifying the global war on terror. The 'difficult questions' of the just war tradition have been overlooked in the need to provide a moral justification for an intervention that was contrary to international law.

#### Anything this justified under the template of virtuous violence---the aff is a prior question

Campos 07 (Joseph H. Campos, The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power, google books pg 101)

Later it was discovered that the U.S.' strikes against terrorist facilities in Sudanwere in fact attacks on pharmaceutical facilities. As long as the state maintains and successfully promotes its virtuous violence, it is able to name any action as justified in defense of the state and the security of its citizenry. Terrorist violence, not statist violence, is portrayed as the outlaw component of the international world order. Everything within the control of the state - from vast bodies of water, to borders, and ultimately to the complex working of the individual body - becomes a national security site that must be secured against the violence of terrorism. The state frames terrorists as inhumane individuals who corrupt the battlefields of statist control as it turns the "war" from actual fields of battle with physical space to fields of battle that are indeterminate, unstructured, and malleable. "The enemies of peace cannot defeat us with traditional military means" (Clinton, 1999: 86) and thus they warp time and space "realities" of the state in their production of fear and terror. The "civilized" order is then solidified and enacted by the state in the face of terrorism's "uncivilized" nature.

#### The 1AC is a prerequisite to their criticism of U.S. imperialism and militarism – the intersection of targeted killing and just war is key

Sullins 10 (John P., Ph.D @ Binghamton University in Philosophy, Computers, and Cognitive Science, “Aspects of Telerobotic Systems” <http://www.xn--bundesheer-sterreich-ebc.org/pdf_pool/publikationen/20101105_et_ethical_and_legal_aspects_of_unmanned_systems_sullins.pdf>)

Regarding the impact of telerobotic weapon systems on warfare, where do you see the main challenges in the field of just war theory and how should the armed forces respond to these challenges? Just war theory is by no means uncontroversial but I use it since there are no rival theories that can do a better job than just war theory even with its flaws. It is, of course, preferable to resolve political differences through diplomacy and cultural exchange, but I do think that if conflict is inevitable, we must attempt to fight only just wars and propagate those wars in an ethical manner. If we can assume our war s just, then in order for a weapons system to be used ethically in that conflict, it must be rationally and consciously controlled towards just end results. Telerobotic weapons systems impact our ability to fight just wars in the following ways. First they seem to be contributing to what I call the normalization of warfare. Telerobots contribute to the acceptance of warfare as a normal part of every- day life. These systems can be controlled from across the globe so pilots living in Las Vegas can work a shift fighting the war in the Middle East and then drive home and spend time with the family. While this may seem like it is preferable. I think it subtly moves combat into a normal everyday activity in direct confrontation with just war theory that demands that warfare be a special circumstance that is propa- gated only in an effort to quickly return to peaceful relations. Also, telerobots contribute to the myth of surgical warfare and limit our ability to view one's enemies as fellow moral agents. That last bit is often hard for people to understand, but moral agents have to be given special regard even when they are your enemy. Just war attempts to seek a quick and efficient end to hostilities and return to a point where the enemy combatants can again respect one another's moral worth. For instance, look how many of the European belligerents in WWII are now closely allied with each other. The way one conducts hostilities must not be done in a way that prevents future cooperation. Telerobotic weapons seem to be doing just the opposite. The victims of these weapons have claimed that they are cowardly and that far from being surgical, they create devas- tating civilian casualties. These allegations may or may not be true, but they are the image that much ot the world has ot those countries that are using these weapons tan- ning the (lames of intergenerational hatred between cultures. So what you are saying is, that the current method of using UAVs might actually endanger one of the principles of just war theory, the probability of obtaining a lasting peace (iustus finis), in other words the short term military achieve- ments might curb the long term goals of peace? Yes, that is exactly right. People who have had this technology used against them are unlikely to torgive or reconcile. When these technologies are used to strike in areas that are not combat zones they tend to fan the flames of future conflict even if they might have succeeded in eliminating a current threat. This can cause a state of perpetual warfare or greatly exacerbate one that is already well underway. For in- stance, we can see that the use of remote controlled bombs, missiles and drones by both sides of the conflict in Palestine are not ending the fight but are instead building that conflict to new highs of vio- lence. The armed forces should respond to this by understanding the long- term political costs that come with short-term political expediency. Right now, a drone strike that cau- ses civilian casualties hardly raises concern in the home audience. But in the rest ol the world it is a source of great unease. It is also important to resist the temptation to normalize telerobotic combat operations. I would suggest backing off on using these weapons for delivery of lethal force and move back to reconnais- sance missions. And yes. I do know that that will never happen, but at least we should use these weapons only under tight scrutiny, in declared combat zones, with the intent both to justly propagate the conflict and eliminate non combatant casualties. One question connected to the normalization ot warfare through telerobotics, is the so called shift- work fighting. Where do you see the main challenges in the blending of war and civilian life and how could this be countered? I need to be careful here so that I am not misunderstood. I do under- stand that these technologies take the war fighters that would have had to risk their own lives in these missions out of danger and put in their place an easily replaceable machine. That is a moral good. But what I want to emphasize is that it is not an unequivocal good. Even if our people are not getting hurt, there will be real human agents on the other end of the cross hairs. Making a shoot or don't shoot decision is one of the most profound a moral agent can be called on to make. It can not be done in an unthinking or business-as-usual way. When we blend war fighting with daily life we remove these decisions from the special moral territory they inhabit in just war theory and replace it with the much more casual and pragmatic world of daily life. Realistically I do not think there is anyway to counter this trend. It is politically expedient from the viewpoint of the com- manders, it is preferable to the individual war fighters, and there does not seem to be any interna- tional will to challenge the coun- tries that are using UAVs in this way. As the technology advances we will see more and more naval craft and armoured fighting vehi- cles operated teleroboticaly and semi autonomously as well. For instance, this is a major plank of the future warfare planning in America and quite a bit of money is being directed at making it a real- ity. It is my hope though, that these planners will take some of these critiques seriously and work to keep the operators of these future machines as well trained and pro- fessional as possible and that they operate them with no cognitive dissonance. By that I mean the operators should be well aware that they are operating lethal ma- chinery in a war zone and that it is not just another day at the office.

## \*\*\*2AC

### 2AC Can’t Solve All Violence

### 2AC v. WestGA

#### B. Virtuous Violence DA – their epistemological criticism fails when they’ve not engaged Just War theory and virtue – the alternative will fail and the 1AC must be the starting point because the state of exception will extend their targets upon the alternative and strike them down – that’s 1AC Campos – AND just war theory is what allows the continue fabrication of violence and Islamophobia against Muslim and Black communities and against the identity positions of the alternative

Berat 8 (Hamza, Chairman of Future Global Network, a network of NGOs based in Kuala Lumpur dedicated to the peaceful co-existence of humanity, “Islamophobia: Challenges and the Way Out,”)

Supported by Western Media, an atmosphere of racism and xenophobia against Muslims has unfolded in the West, thus providing fake legitimacy for the US war agenda. The “just war” theory serves to camouflage the nature of US war plans… fabricating an enemy among Muslims, using Iran as ploy, conveying the illusion that the West is under imminent danger of nuclear attack by “Islamic terrorists” supported by Iran.

#### To say that the judge must accept the position and perspective of the oppressed assumes they can be heard --- the alternative reifies silencing because the intersection of just war and targeted killing produces a distancing that universal criticism simply can’t solve – only our intervention allows their alternative to come into fruition

Shaw 13 (Ian G., Lecturer in Human Geography, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” Geopolitics, 00:1–24, 2013, <http://www.unice.fr/crookall-cours/iup_geopoli/docs/predator-drones.pdf>)

While the Predator Empire may be assembled with dozens rather than hundreds of flight orbits, it is essential that the wholesale psychological damage that is being wrought upon thousands of people is never eclipsed by a technological enframing that so often shields the unbearable humanity of it all. Targeted killings are quickly becoming a "post-political" background issue and a noise that few listen to. This is why the civilian voices from Pakistan and elsewhere need to be heard, since they signify the fundamental "worldly" damage caused by drone strikes, well beyond the "surgical" metaphors that circulate in official state narratives. Indeed. Washington's permanent war is not even an ethical issue for most of the public: It is simply "common sense" to solve complex problems with Predators. An intervention is therefore needed to reposition what counts as human security away from this entrenched logic of "death-as-success."

#### C. Presidential Pre-emption DA – And a criticism of what justifications sustain targeted killing and the resultant militarism is particularly necessary for countering the extension of virtuous violence against the black body

Bloice et al 13 (Carl Bloice is a BlackCommentator.com Editorial Board member, writer and senior activist in San Francisco, a member of the National Coordinating Committee of the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, a moderator at portside.org and formerly worked for a healthcare union. Bill Fletcher, Jr. is a long-time racial justice, labor and international activist and writer. He is a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies and the immediate past president of TransAfrica Forum. He is the co-author of Solidarity Divided. Jamala is a long-time organizer and writer. She is a 2011 Alston-Bannerman Fellow and author of The Best of The Way I See It & Other Political Writings. She is the co-founder of the Organization for Black Struggle. “Black America and Obama’s Foreign Policy,” http://www.zcommunications.org/black-america-and-obama-s-foreign-policy-by-bill-fletcher-jr.html)

Well, this is a partial list, but the point here is that there is something very wrong in Obama’s foreign policy, yet you would not know that from Black America’s response. Foreign policy is not being debated on most African American talk radio programs and very rarely do we hear African American commentators in the mainstream media address the limitations of US foreign policy under Obama. While the Congressional Black Caucus has increasingly criticized the President around domestic policies, particularly the need by the administration to address the economic depression-like conditions of Black America, there is relative silence on foreign policy. This relative silence appears to be rooted in the same general problem that has afflicted Black America since the election of Obama: a belief that criticism and pressure is somehow destructive and disloyal. One can only conclude this in light of the fact that on most foreign policy matters Black America has shown an historic identification with the struggles for liberation and independence, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. African Americans were the most critical demographic segment of the USA when it came to the US invasion of Iraq, for instance, and we regularly criticize and openly oppose interventionist activities by the USA…except when they are carried out by the Obama Administration. We are not waving our fingers at anyone. Rather we are suggesting that this is a dangerous course of action because it represents a failure to recognize that the Obama administration is not about one individual named Barack Obama. It is an administration overseeing policies, many historically rooted, in the objective of building and sustaining global domination. In other words, this goes way beyond a question of Obama’s personal views and beliefs and speaks to the sort of administration that he constructed, including who were named top officials and who were excluded. By remaining silent in the face of US aggression (and law violations, such as the murder of Awlaki and drone attacks that take the lives of many civilian noncombatants) we are making several mistakes. For one, we are ignoring the precedent that is being set. Kill one US citizen without even an indictment (let alone a trial) and where does it end? Wave our swords at Iran and promote destabilization, and does this result in an all-out war? Send troops to Uganda, and does this become another Vietnam? Cajole military forces in one African country to invade another? None of this benefits Black America—not to mention the rest of the world—in the slightest and under other circumstances many African Americans would be protesting. Paradoxically, it is probably time for us to rethink Obama’s remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus banquet in September. When he said African Americans needed to stop complaining and put on our marching boots, many people became upset and felt insulted. But let’s think about this for a moment. Too many of us have been content to complain—sometimes bitterly—in private about what we fail to see from the Obama administration. So, maybe it is time to put on those marching boots, indeed, and march in protest not only against the demonic activities of the Republicans but as well against US aggression carried out by the first African American President of the United States of America? If not now, when? If not you (us), who?

#### Although sites of violence and oppression are heterogeneous in nature – the permutation connects the dots of anti-blackness in order to effectively dismantle the perpetuation of white empire both domestically and internationally

Balasubramanian 8/8/13 (Janani, B.A. Feminist and Engineering (Atmosphere & Energy), studying issues of food sovereignty, food justice, and sustainability from a scientific, social, cultural, and ethical perspective. “Zimmermans and Drones: Antiblackness and Global Domination” <http://www.blackgirldangerous.org/2013/08/201388zimmermans-and-drones-antiblackness-and-global-domination/>)

I launch this piece from the challenge that Asam Ahmad offers in his piece: ‘We are NOT all Trayvon Martin.‘ It’s a useful phrase that breaks through the multicultural ‘people of color’ rhetoric quickly. Ahmad keeps us cognizant of the specificity of antiblack violence: ‘Trayvon was not murdered because he was a person of color. This verdict was not delivered because he was a person of color. Trayvon was murdered because he was Black. This verdict was delivered because he was Black.’ Ahmad concludes by asking non-Black POC to question and challenge the ways that antiblackness operate in our communities and social spheres. I want to build on this analysis further, to a structural level. I want to work from the acknowledgement that we are absolutely not all Trayvon Martin, but the violence that different communities experience is entangled with and fulcrumed by the violence against him, and against each Black life executed in the US every 28 hours. Antiblackness is not only contained in the interpersonal (because racism never is), but instead manifests also as patterns of violence and exploitation by the state and its regimes, as history, as legacy. Antiblackness, and other patterns of racism, are not contained in single incidents or moments of time (like Trayvon Martin’s murder), but are situated in the accumulated violence against peoples. It is for this reason that I ask us to move from a situational/social analysis of antiblack violence and consider how it materially undergirds patterns of violence against other people of color. Because the erasure of antiblack violence is not only manifested as failure to talk about, acknowledge, and resist violence on Black bodies, but also the erasure of how violence against other POC (and the whole US imperialist project) operates in relation to antiblackness. I maintain that solidarity does not just look like calling out antiblack appropriation, comments, etc, but also pinpointing the material connections between struggles, especially at moments of extreme duress and mass racialized violence. In their piece ‘Figuring the Prison’ Jared Sexton and Elizabeth Lee ask us to situate the torture scandal at Abu Ghraib prison (in Baghdad, Iraq) in relation to Black incarceration, which in turn represents a continuous translation across generation from the Black-subject-as-Slave to the Black-subject-as-Prisoner. Torture at Abu Ghraib, according to mass media and public conversation, appeared to be a racist project carried out against the vague idea of ‘brownness’, a racialization separate from domestically incarcerated Black people. This is an era rife with ‘replacement Negros’, Sexton and Lee argue, with characters (‘the terrorist’, for example) who are uncritically inserted into 21st century conversations around racism without an interrogation of their linkages to antiblackness. Following Sexton and Lee, Abu Ghraib (or Guantanamo, for that matter), without an analysis of antiblackness, can be construed as a ‘space of exception’, rather than an experiment that fully follows from slavery and the US prison-industrial complex. Without understanding how Blackness and antiblackness are tied up in brutal and mass incarceration, the political reaction to Abu Ghraib has the danger of promoting ‘reform’ and ‘revision’ rather than the more radical vision: prison abolition. This is an urgent structural analysis. I write this as President Obama is sending drones to Pakistan, which you can visualize here. I write this as the US sends $3 billion a year in military aid to Israel, materially supporting the maintenance of the gaza strip as an open air prison. I write this on the heels of the anniversary of the shooting at a Sikh Gurudwara in Wisconsin. Last year, Harsha Walia wrote a poignant response in commemoration of the Wisconsin tragedy, that did precisely the work of connecting this incident of violence against Sikhs and other, broader structures of White supremacy and empire. She calls for fellow Sikhs to build solidarity with other racialized communities: ‘with Muslim communities bearing the brunt of Islamophobia, with Blacks who disproportionately endure police violence and over- incarceration, with Indigenous people who are being dispossessed of their lands and resources, with non-status migrants who have been deemed illegal and are facing deportation.’ Walia’s piece does the critical, challenging work of maintaining the specificity of violence against her community, while also putting it in context with other struggles. Cornel West makes a similar move in his interview with Democracy Now!, where he calls out President Obama for talking about race in relation to Trayvon Martin’s murder without talking about other structures of domination, in which the President and the state are brutally complicit. West calls Obama a ‘global George Zimmerman’, meaning that the President, like Zimmerman, racially profiles and murders. So when [Obama] comes to talk about the killing of an innocent person, you say, “Well, wait a minute. What kind of moral authority are you bringing? You’ve got $2 million bounty on Sister Assata Shakur. She’s innocent, but you are pressing that intentionally. Will you press for the justice of Trayvon Martin in the same way you press for the prosecution of Brother Bradley Manning and Brother Edward Snowden?” So you begin to see the hypocrisy. In a way, Obama’s statements about Trayvon Martin and the viral refrain ‘I am Trayvon Martin’ are both failures of the same multiculturalism, of considering racism as something broad and incidental, rather than specific and material. West asks: ‘Will [Obama's identification with Trayvon Martin] hide and conceal the fact there’s a criminal justice system in place that has nearly destroyed two generations of very precious, poor black and brown brothers?’. A material consideration of antiblackness in relation to patterns of violence against other POC, and to US imperialism in particular, would hold space for both parallels and specificity. Abu-Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the US prison-industrial complex. Zimmerman and Obama. COINTELPRO and XKeyscore. These are patterns of policing and violence that inform each other, in psychology, and also in that the military/police strategies deployed domestically and abroad mirror each other. For example, Obama is a global George Zimmerman, but also: Zimmerman is a domestic drone. Solidarity can begin with challenging attitudes in our communities, but it must also include connecting those dots between the tactics of enslavement, incarceration, colonialism, and empire.

#### Lifting the veneer of the drone and targeted killing policy is critical to re-examining White Supremacist epistemology – a refusal of the 1AC produces an ethical distancing that reproduces coloniality and flips the alternative

Newman 12 (Christopher, “‘Moralization’ of Technologies – Military Drones: A Case Study” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/02/moralization-of-technologies-military-drones-a-case-study/>)

The Case of Military Drones The US military alone already employs several thousand unarmed aerial vehicles all over the world and also the number of lethal UAVs has seen a spectacular 1,200% increase over the past six years (“Flight of the drones,” 2011). With over forty countries now developing unmanned aerial systems, it is indispensable to seriously discuss the moral and ethical issues linked to this technology (Singer, 2009a). Using drones may give rise to a number of unanticipated problems and ethical challenges.[2] As has been established above, technologies mediate how humans perceive reality and also co-shape people’s decision-making. In most cases, for example when looking through a pair of binoculars, we do not think twice about trusting the mediating effect of technology because we trust the physical laws of optics and there are usually no ethical dilemmas that result from this situation (Sullins, 2009). By contrast, in the case of military drones, it is evident that the military pilot who is controlling the drone usually from thousands of miles away perceives reality in, say, Pakistan’s tribal areas, through “machine vision” (Salvini, 2007, p. 156). This means that the infrared camera and other high-tech video sensors on the robotic drone filters and purges (visual) information, thereby creating an mediated image which is transferred to the remote pilot’s screen. As a result of this mediation of reality, the tele-operators of drones see the world differently than they would without this “telepistemological distancing” (Sullins, 2009, p. 268). This refers to the effect that the battlefield information mediated through the technologies on remotely operated drones has on the tele-operator’s epistemological perception of the remote reality and hence begs the question of how this distancing impacts the pilot’s ability to make ethical decisions. As we have seen from the theoretical discussion earlier, the very decision to fire a lethal weapon is co-shaped by technological artifacts (in this case the drone’s sensors and the broader technical system of communication between the pilot and the UAV). Therefore, it is insufficient to assume that since a moral agent is controlling the drone, the actions of the socio-technical ensemble must be moral. The reason for this is that the inherent design of military drones limits the ability of humans to be in full intelligent control of them (Sullins, 2009). On the one hand, the telepistemological and, by extension, physical distancing in the form of a real-time image on a remote screen serves as a protective shield which minimizes (and effectively moves towards zero) the threat to the human soldier and this aspect is arguably ethical and morally good.[3] On the other hand, however, this same distancing effect can lead to the dangers of abstraction and moral disengagement (Salvini, 2007). This means that this type of warfare could contribute to dehumanization and disregard for the moral agency of enemy combatants in drone pilots’ perceptions (Sullins, 2009). These moral buffers may have an adverse effect on people’s adherence to the rules of engagement and the laws of armed conflict and could co-shape people’s actions in such a way as to make war crimes more likely (Sparrow, 2008). Recalling the notion that moral responsibility must be borne jointly by humans and the technological artifact, several points are in order concerning the design of UAVs. First, since the user interface that pilots use is the primary way in which operators perceive the remote reality on the battlefield, it is expected that that the design of this interface co-shapes the decisions of life and death that remote pilots make. Therefore, it can be argued that engineers should have a responsibility to try as best they can to “build ethics into the user interface” (Sparrow, 2008, p. 181). Obviously, this is a tremendously difficult task and the details of how exactly to do this are beyond the scope of this paper but in essence the designers should work to design an interface that facilitates killing where it is justified and discourages it where it is not (Cummings, 2006); in other words, they should try to “desig[n] out war crimes” (Sparrow, 2008, p. 179). Engineers could do this by striving to build ‘good’ sensors and interfaces that present the operator with the necessary moral information relevant to the combat situation. Furthermore, drone technology can be ‘moralized’ by counteracting the creation of ‘moral buffers’ between the pilot and his/her actions. This entails ensuring that the extent to which operators rely on the increasing amount of automation in military drones does not exceed a threshold where the human feels less responsible for an action since it was fully or partly the machine that made the decision (Sparrow, 2008). Here, the co-shaping role of technology is clearly evident and the moral challenges inherent in the design of military drones cannot be underestimated. While by no means disregarding the moral agency of drone operators, the concept of technological mediation highlights the ethical importance of the ‘moralization’ of drone technology through engineers at the design stage. To this end, engineers might do well to perform a ‘mediation analysis’ in order to better anticipate the mediating effects that their designs have on human perception and action. Cognizant of the poor ethical record of human soldiers with the technology currently available, some scholars have started talking about the implications of taking the design of drones one step further, towards semi- or fully-autonomous uninhabited aerial vehicles where humans may remain ‘in the loop’ but more in a monitoring than a controlling role (Arkin, 2009; Sullins, 2010). The roboticist and roboethicist Ronald Arkin (2009) has developed a prototype of a so-called ‘ethical governor’ which should enable robots to do the right thing. His basic premise is that, with time, it will be feasible to program military drones so that they behave more ethically on the battlefield than humans (Arkin, 2009). While Arkin admits that the algorithms for his ethical governor are not yet ready for use in current combat operations, he is convinced that there is no “fundamental scientific limitation to achieving the goal” (Orca, 2009). In his own way, then, Arkin strives to ‘moralize’ drone technology by embedding in it an ethical algorithm and thereby turning the autonomous robotic systems into artificial moral agents of their own. This is manifest illustration of how the designers of a technology are “doing ethics by other means” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 207). Moreover, some scholars in the field view the development and deployment of fully autonomous military drones as an inevitable outcome of the combination of the vast research and political will directed towards this technology (Sullins, 2010; Wallach & Allen, 2009). However, this is highly questionable when viewed through an STS framework, which maintains that technological development does not follow some predetermined inner logic but rather that technological development is the outcome of complex negotiations between relevant actors. By the same token, a senior US military official has commented that the limiting factor in the development of drone technology will more likely be policy than the technology itself (“Flight of the drones,” 2011). When it comes to policy, a further ethical challenge of drone technology is that it may make warfare more likely to occur. While the above-mentioned distancing effect has the morally good result of removing soldiers from harm’s way, the tele-operation of military drones also entails the unfortunate consequence of potentially increasing the likelihood of war. The rationale behind this is that it is politically much more palatable to deploy robotic drones rather than human soldiers and that using drones appears to be an attractive way to fight ‘clean’ and surgical wars. In other words, as the political and human cost of fighting wars diminishes, the threshold of decision-makers to start an armed conflict is considerably lowered (Singer, 2009a). When the likelihood of war increases as a result of drone technology, this is obviously not an ethical outcome and therefore more scrutiny of military drone activities is needed (Sullins, 2009). Moreover, keeping in mind that technological artifacts are not merely neutral means but co-shapers of our actions, it becomes evident that drones help constitute the conditions of possibility that re-shape our practices and influence our ends (Coeckelbergh, 2011). What is more, flexibility of interpretation still exists with regard to what doctrines the American military will adopt when organizing its drones and therefore a serious public discussion of how this technology might influence military ends is called for (Geraci, 2011; Singer, 2009b). Finally, a public discussion about drone technology should not limit itself to the influence on military doctrine but should also address the challenge of democratizing the development of military robotics including lethal drones with the end of contributing to the ‘moralization’ of the technology. There have already been several initiatives taken in this direction. For instance, Moshkina and Arkin (2007) conducted a survey aimed at better understanding the expectations that various demographic groups (the public, researchers, policy-makers and military personnel) hold regarding battlefield robotics. If the results of this study (and similar ones) are seriously taken into account by the engineers and other groups directly involved in the design process of these technologies, this may bring us a step closer to ‘moralizing’ military drone technology by democratizing the design process of military robotics. It must be pointed out here that it is questionable how much democratic influence is desirable when it comes to designing military technology due to the sensitive nature of this field. Nevertheless, there have been other serious efforts to congregate experts of various relevant fields (inter alia engineers, international lawyers and military ethicists) in order to collaborate more effectively in addressing the ethical and legal implications of new military robotics (Lucas, 2010). One of the most prominent forms of democratic deliberation on this subject finds its embodiment in the form of the ‘Consortium on Emerging Technologies, Military Operations, and National Security’ (CETMONS), which was initiated in 2008 (Lucas, 2010, p. 291). By engaging relevant stakeholders in the development process of drone technology, this consortium appears to be in line with the above-mentioned ‘Constructive Technology Assessment’ approach developed by Rip, Misa and Schot (1995). Hopefully, in this way, STS scholars’ goal of opening the black box of technological development can contribute to society being better able to address the challenges surrounding the ‘moralization’ of military drones. Conclusion This paper analyzed how the challenges of ‘moralizing’ military drones can be addressed. Firstly, it was demonstrated that ethics and morality have both a human and a technological dimension and that the two spheres are in fact closely intertwined. Secondly, the concept of technological mediation was introduced and it was examined how technologies co-shape both our perceptions of reality and our moral agency. Thereafter, it was argued that the inevitable technological mediation in our technological culture means that technology design is an inherently moral process and that engineers should aim to ‘moralize’ technologies so as to shape our actions for the better. Subsequently, these theoretical concepts were applied to the case of military drones. It was shown how understanding the mediating effects of this technology and ensuring wider participation in the development process of drone technology can help us ‘moralize’ their design. By focusing on the ethical importance of a good user interface and utilizing public deliberative fora we may be able to address some of the moral challenges that drones entail. Since technological artifacts stabilize human relationships by co-shaping our perceptions and actions in our constructed environment, it is of utmost importance that we design military robots with human priorities foremost in mind (Geraci, 2011; Latour, 2005). Our technologies offer both peril and promise, enabling as well as constraining our moral actions and therefore we must heed the consequences that technological mediation has for our ability to act ethically. Realizing the fundamental importance of gaining a better understanding of how to address the ethical challenges of military drones, there has been an “ethics surge” (Lucas, 2010, p. 292) in the field. However, recalling the quote at the beginning of this paper and presuming that we do not want drone pilots making life and death decisions with the feeling that they are merely playing a video game, it appears that much work remains to be done in ‘moralizing’ drone technology design in order to promote more ethical behavior on the remote battlefield.

#### Specific demands are key- their call for universal opposition to war is doomed to fail

Pascal Bruckner 86, Maître de conférence at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, 1986

(Tears of the White Man)

Here again, though, our analysis must be refined. A universal and angelic and limitless fellowship would be disembodied, insufficient to deal with the misfortunes of any particular category or group of people. Through large-scale institutions, unions, political parties, and associations, I can reinforce and enlarge it to global dimensions, and through them I am obliged to make gestures of abstract charity in the form of food, medicine, and money, to countries whose names I do not know. But we choose our causes as our causes choose us, in an inner encounter with the outside world, in which the world proposes as much as we dispose. This is why we cannot honestly embrace all causes and also why we cannot be disinterested in any of them. When we express concern for Poland, we may be scolded by those who would have us also remember El Salvador, Lebanon, or South Africa. We must reply that a thousand causes for outrage are only so many reasons to do nothing, and that if we are urged not to prefer one struggle over another, East or West or South, we are being pushed toward an involvement that has no limits, which is really complete lack of involvement. It would mean the fairyland of solidarity with no concern. I feel solidarity, period, like some mystical and bloodless love that floats in the air. To be effective, solidarity has to be circumscribed and channeled. Other solidarities can be based on it, but only as aims sought by other people. To be effective, responsibility must choose a limited field of action and a specific geographic area (which is not related to its distance). Without that, it is indeterminate, blind. Our need for political action and sympathy beyond national borders must be tailored to the scale of causes in a particular area, beyond which there is nothing but the hubbub and babbling of the news media. In this respect, too much generosity is suspicious. A fellowship that expresses itself in general terms and that is incapable even of saying the name of those people whom it helps is the solidarity of armchair windbags. It dies of its own purity, from choosing everything. It is nothing but a grandiose slogan, like the postwar label “existentialist,” which was invoked everywhere and anytime. It gives support to the most dissimilar causes with the same enthusiasm. The same people who support the PLO in July with similar arguments, and six months later will support some other guerilla movement. Details are minimized in all cases, and common denominators are sought where historical details should call for exact analyses, strict attention to the facts. It is purely sentimental attachment to people in the outside world, and the Cambodians, Palestinians, and Lebanese all march through the square marked “Victim.”; it is the same preordained ritual for different participants. This kind of solidarity is for mercenaries. of the news media who must impartially cover all the active spots on earth. Let us not ask more of the media than what they already do quite well---make us aware of human problems. Our sort of attachment to the outside world cannot follow the rhythm of the news, even if we do care about it. We must learn to detach ourselves from the hassle of the headlines and hot stories, so we can take root somewhere on earth. Newspapers and television cannot possibly serve as a guide to action because, when the TV screen stops talking about a country, it continues to exist. If we based our attention to the world on the pattern of the news media, we would develop the flexibility of public opinion, which is too apt to take a stand for one group one day and another the next. That is a kind of technological solidarity for the busy ~~man~~ who wastes his effort and spreads ~~him~~self too thinly. A hand held out in this way will soon be pulled back; reflex solidarity provides aid, but then takes it back again.

#### And our criticism of the federal government is empowering, critical to prevent complacency, and actualizes politics that checks presidential unilateralism

Young 13 (Kelly Michael Young, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics, Wayne State University, “Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers,” http://public.cedadebate.org/node/13)

When we wrote the paper, we argued that the topic would make for good debate because it was timely “but not too timely.” Little could we have anticipated a number of events that occurred since April 22 that would make us somewhat regret this statement. First, on May 23, President Obama gave an important speech at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. that publicly outlined a number of new guidelines for UAV strikes and repeated his call on Congress to begin closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention center (http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-23/politics/39467399\_1\_war-and-peace-cold-war-civil-war). While none of these procedures or calls fundamentally changed the Obama administration’s rationale or legal defense for these policies (http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0524/Has-Obama-tightened-US...), the speech certainly raised the profile of the debate over executive war powers considerably. Second, on June 14, The Guardian newspaper released information obtained from whistleblower Richard Snowden, a U.S. programmer for the National Security Agency (NSA), which revealed the existence of secret NSA programs that collected telephone metadata and internet surveillance programs such as PRISM (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data). Third, on August 31, Obama announced that he would seek congressional approval for a military strike against Syria (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html). Although the President made clear in his announcement that he believed he had the constitutional authority to strike without approval, for some commentators (http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/319827-obama-breaks-from-precedent-on-syria/), Obama’s announcement represented a complete reversal in presidential war making precedent, especially in light of the 2011 Libyan intervention. As the commentary and reaction to this announcement and the other recent events of the past four months continue to play out, we believe that these events will produce a robust and dynamic context for a year-long collegiate debate about presidential war powers and congressional oversight. While we are amazed that so much has happened in such a short time, we believe that the core of the controversy – should Congress or the Courts impose additional restrictions on presidential war powers—remains fundamentally the same. Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States. Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### The permutation encapsulates their criticism of white supremacy and militarism through the position of the black international and our scholarship isn’t mutually exclusive with theirs – there is no trade-off between our epistemological foundations and thiers – to say our methodologies are diametrically opposed to one another partakes in a violent form of knowledge production that only voting aff can solve – this is an independent reason to vote affirmative

Allen 7 (Douglas Allen Department of Philosophy, University of Maine “Mahatma Gandhi on Violence and Peace Education,” Project Muse)

Gandhi, of course, is very concerned with violence in the more usual sense of overt physical violence. He devotes considerable attention to identifying such violence, trying diverse approaches to conflict resolution, and providing nonviolent alternatives. This is evident in his many writings and struggles directed at war, overt terrorism, outbreaks of class and caste violence, and Hindu-Muslim communal violence. 6 However, for Gandhi, such serious overt violence constitutes only a small part of the violence that must be addressed by peace education. Gandhi’s approach to education emphasizes both the multidimensional nature of violence and the structural violence of the status quo. Educational violence cannot be separated from linguistic, economic, psychological, cultural, political, religious, and other forms of violence. These many dimensions of violence interact, mutually reinforce each other, and provide the subject matter and challenge for peace education. For example, language, inside or outside the classroom, can serve as a violent weapon used to control, manipulate, humiliate, intimidate, terrorize, oppress, exploit, and dominate other human beings. ‘‘Peaceful’’ situations, free from overt violent conflict, may be defined by deep psychological violence. If I am filled with ego-driven hatred, manifested as self-hatred and hatred for others, I am a very violent person. This will be manifested in how I relate to myself and to others, even if I repress or control my desire to strike out violently at the targets of my hatred. In his analysis of ‘‘normal’’ British colonial education in India, Gandhi frequently analyzes how the structures, values, and goals of such educational models inflicted great psychological and cultural violence on colonized Indians. Unlike most philosophers and others who adopt ethical and spiritual approaches, Gandhi places a primary emphasis on basic material needs and the ‘‘normal’’ state of economic violence. Repeatedly, he uses ‘‘violence’’ as synonymous with exploitation. He is attentive to unequal, asymmetrical, violent power relations in which some, who possess wealth, capital, and other material resources, are able to exploit and dominate those lacking such economic power. Gandhi identifies with the plight of starving and impoverished human beings and with the plight of peasants, workers, and others who are disempowered and dominated. He emphasizes that such economic violence is not the result of supernatural design or an immutable law of nature. It involves human-caused oppression, exploitation, domination, injustice, and suffering, and, hence, we as human beings are responsible. If I could change conditions and alleviate suffering, but I choose either to profit from such structural violence or not to get involved, I perpetuate, am complicit in, and am responsible for the economic violence of the status quo. Obviously, incorporating such concerns of economic violence broadens and radically changes the nature of peace education. In pointing to Gandhi’s radical challenges and to his value as a catalyst, we may touch briefly on a few aspects of educational violence in typical modern university settings. While focusing on universities, we must keep in mind that Gandhi submits that peace education must emphasize the formative training and socialization of young children. Most people do not think of universities and classroom teaching as violent, but Gandhi argues that ‘‘normal’’ university education is very violent, in terms of both multidimensional violence and the violence of the status quo. From Gandhi’s perspective, the ‘‘peaceful,’’ seemingly nonviolent classroom can be a very violent place, even when there are no actual outbursts of violence. A professor may use the grade as a weapon to threaten, intimidate, terrorize, and control students, including those who raise legitimate concerns questioning the analysis of the teacher who has institutional power over their futures. A teacher may use language, or even facial expressions and other body-language communication, in a violent way as when ignoring, humiliating, or ridiculing students who ask questions. Most often, these students will become silenced and will not subject themselves to the dangers of any further such terrifying humiliation. In more general terms, Gandhi would emphasize that universities educate students and do research in violent ways. Modern universities have increasingly become commodified and corporatized. Education is a good investment. Commodified students, as a means to some corporate end, are our most important ‘‘product.’’ Through education we increase their market-driven exchange value. Central Gandhian ethical, cultural, spiritual, social, and humanistic priorities regarding peace and nonviolence are usually ignored, occasionally attacked as unrealistic, and sometimes acknowledged but then unfunded and marginalized. Gandhi views many courses, departments, and colleges as violent even if this is taken as the status quo in no need of justification. Economic and business courses assume a framework and orientation in which students are educated to calculate how to maximize their narrow, ego-defined self-interests and how to defeat opponents and win economically in a world of adversarial, win-lose relations. For Gandhi, we are ‘‘educating’’ our students to such dominant economic models, models in which economic success is synonymous with maximizing economic exploitation, and exploitation is always violent. Similarly, Gandhi’s peace education would analyze most political science or government courses as inherently violent since they claim to be value-free but actually assume, as an immutable given, a status quo framework in which we live in a violent world of antagonistic adversarial relations. The goal is to win by amassing greater power and dominating those challenging one’s power interests. Similarly, public relations and communications courses usually adopt a violent framework in which the goal is to use language, images, and media to manipulate and control others, to get one’s way, and to maximize one’s narrow interests in winning in a world of violent relations. In terms of his own professional background, Gandhi was a barrister, and he makes the same kinds of criticisms of the violent adversarial legal system in which the goal is not cooperation, reconciliation, and peaceful relations, but exacerbating and exploiting multidimensional violence and winning at any cost by defeating the other. To provide one other, disciplinary illustration, Gandhi’s peace education points to the normal violence of the status quo reflected in most disciplines of the sciences, engineering, and technology. Scholars uncritically adopt models of instrumental rationality in which they provide the means allowing for the ends of control, domination, and exploitation of other human beings and of nature. Gandhi is not focusing on individual professors or students who are rewarded for acquiring and applying such scientific and technological means. His more fundamental and radical critique is of the unacknowledged structural violence that defines such disciplines and has devastating violent economic, military, political, and environmental effects on most of humanity and on nature. One of the most valuable contributions of Gandhi’s approach to violence is to broaden our focus so that we are able to situate our peace-education concerns in terms of the larger dominant, multidimensional structures of the violence of the status quo. For example, we uncritically accept the existence of a permanent war economy as just the way things are. We do not critique how the permanent war economy was created, is maintained, and flourishes best under conditions of insecurity, terror, violence, and war. We do not critique how it removes resources that could be provided to meet vital human needs and to provide alternative nonviolent ways of relating. Instead we accept a view of jobs and economic security dependent on a permanent war economy of insecurity, and we train students to become functionaries and contributors to a more effective war economy based on the perpetuation and domination of structural violence. Similarly, Gandhian peace education raises an awareness of how universities have increasingly become integral parts of what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex and what Senator J. William Fulbright reformulated as the military-industrial-academic complex.7 Universities increasingly approach transnational corporations, the military, the government, and other funding sources and promote themselves as valuable places to invest. Universities, as institutions of educational violence, provide the means, in terms of applied research and the education of students, to further the ends of the structural violence of the military-industrial complex based on the hierarchical, multidimensional, and violent relations of control, exploitation, and domination.

#### --we cant talk about drones in the abstract- that cedes their control to the executive- public deliberation about actual technology is critical

Druck-J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School-10

Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare. Cornell Law Review, 98(1), 209-238.

Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressuring Congress into enforcing domestic law (namely, the WPR), then that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven warfare abroad.135 As a result, fewer checks on presidential military actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral presidential initiatives. But if the new era of warfare removes the very issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be concerned about the American public’s increasing numbness to it all? The answer is undoubtedly yes. First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hostilities initially.136 Without having to worry about any of the traditional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now gone. When machines, rather than human beings, are on the front lines, the public (and, as a result, politicians and courts) will not act to stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply stop caring about our increased actions abroad, regardless of their validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm. But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems somewhat misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare. Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities, but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense “wake up the populace” in order to check potentially unconstitutional action.137 Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only machines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny? The answer is that a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless. War by its very nature is unpredictable.138 Indeed, one of the major grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a war we did not sign up for in the first place.139 The problem is not the initial action itself but the escalation. Therefore, while drone strikes might not facially involve any large commitment,

the true threat is the looming possibility of escalation.140 That threat exists in the context of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation that would require troops on the ground.141 In both cases, an apparently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation involving harms associated with traditional warfare.142 Worse yet, even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur after the fact.143 If we want restraints on presidential action, they should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and this would require public awareness about the use of drones.144 As such, whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones themselves145 or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was ostensibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions, even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare.146 Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of technology-drive warfare involves humanitarian concerns. If one takes the more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare becomes more attenuated, the potential humanitarian costs associated with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without any substantial backlash. Rather than take note of whom we target abroad, for example, the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare forces the public to place “enormous trust in our leaders” despite the fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessarily guarantee their accuracy.147 Accordingly, as the level of public scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humanitarian damage abroad.148 At the very least, some dialogue should occur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven warfare regime, that conversation never occurs.149 Of course, this Note has argued that the issues associated with technology-driven warfare (an increased level of military involvement abroad, potential for escalation, humanitarian difficulties, etc.) though very real, are less prominent than the harms associated with traditional warfare. But perhaps this premise is incorrect; that is, perhaps technology-driven warfare does present sufficient harm to trigger social and political scrutiny. For example, pecuniary harms are very real contemporary concerns, and they seem to play an increased role in determining a country’s standing.150 In this respect, given the financial costs of drone strikes (and military spending in general),151 perhaps we need not be worried about an absence of public scrutiny. Yet given the traditional costs of war, pecuniary harm hardly seems like the type of concern sufficient to create the type of political checks present in the Civil War, World War I, Vietnam, or Iraq. In all four situations, American lives were at stake, entire households faced life-changing effects of war in a very real way, and the entire country saw major social and political transformations. Economic harm is certainly an issue worth considering, especially as the United States takes on more and more debt; yet, whether that sort of harm rises to the level sufficient to trigger mass citizen mobilization remains to be seen.152 Indeed, if the recent actions in Libya are any indication, financial harm is far too attenuated to create any sort of substantial backlash. Future technology-driven conflicts will likely create a clearer picture of the role of pecuniary damage, but as it stands, this sort of harm fails to “rally the troops” for public attentiveness.

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### Activism

#### Limited demands good- rejecting specific calls against militarism shatters the anti-war movement.

Lovell 82 (ed Sarah Lovell, Tasks of the SWP in the Antiwar Movement, [Resolution of the Fourth Internationalist Caucus in the National Committee submitted to the December 4-8, 1982, plenum], http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/fit/antiwar.htm)

In addition, we as revolutionary Marxists call for the total abolition of the imperialist military budget. But we will not hesitate to work with others who are willing to fight around specific demands for the elimination of individual military programs (such as the MX missile) or for the partial reduction of the war budget in order to fund socially useful programs. These different aspects of the fight against war today are not contradictory, but complementary. We believe that a serious antiwar organization cannot avoid taking up all of them. However, this understanding cannot be an excuse for a sectarian approach toward forces which begin to emerge around one or another part of the struggle, and which do not yet see the whole picture. We should welcome every manifestation of opposition to the U.S. government’s war plans, no matter how limited. Where we have the ability to participate in such struggles we should do so with all enthusiasm. One of our tasks must be to educate in the context of active involvement in the movement—to explain the interconnections and unity of different sides of the question. But we will not get a serious hearing for our ideas from those we are trying to influence if we seem to be sideline critics who refuse to involve themselves in the real day-to-day tasks of building an antiwar movement in this country. One of our primary contributions is an approach to organizing which does not tie the movement into one or another wing of the Democratic or Republican parties. The lack of understanding on this question today is one of the biggest obstacles to mobilizing an effective antiwar fight. It has allowed the capitalist politicians to parade as champions of peace, particularly on the antinuclear issue. We recognize that although there are specific proposals we can make to antiwar activists about how to organize an independent struggle even within the present context of a bourgeois electoral monopoly, the fact of that monopoly creates severe limitations. This situation provides important opportunities for us to explain our ideas on independent working class electoral action to those activists. The biggest challenge the antiwar movement faces is the creation of an organizational vehicle which can provide a real alternative to the posturing of the politicians and can break out of the framework created by the bilateral freeze. There is no ready-made solution to this problem. In some places committees which formed around the freeze will be receptive to our ideas on how to develop the antiwar struggle on the basis of a broader and more correct political focus — one clearly mobilizing opposition to our own government. It is likely that we will especially find forces receptive to this perspective in campus committees. It will be necessary to develop a serious set of proposals for teach-ins, rallies, demonstrations, etc., around specific political slogans such as those mentioned above which can provide a positive alternative to bilateralism. A major focus for this effort in the next few weeks, especially on the West Coast, should be the call issued by the Tijuana solidarity conference for demonstrations in San Diego and Tijuana on January 22. In those parts of the country where distance will make travel to San Diego difficult we should make every effort to have solidarity actions called by local groups and coalitions. It is also important that we not ignore the role of already existing solidarity groups like CISPES. Although the perspectives of this organization have been limited, and it has not by and large seen the need to tap the broad anti-interventionist sentiment in this country (focusing on political support to the goals of the Salvadoran revolutionists), it nevertheless has a great deal of authority, a layer of healthy activists, and has staged some impressive actions. CISPES varies quite a bit from one city to another. Also, there is a large milieu of religious, pacifist, and civil liberties-type organizations and individuals which, given a proper perspective, can play a role in building the movement. Such a correct perspective, which can mobilize the American people in effective action against war, will not arise spontaneously. If revolutionary Marxists do not participate fully, in every way we can (even within organizations which do not yet have a clear political outlook) undertaking a serious effort to educate and win people over to that correct perspective, we cannot expect any other force to emerge which will do it for us.

#### They are activism without organizing—their movement goes nowhere without the ability to address specifics.

Rudd 09 (Mark, When Spontaneity Fails ...What It Takes to Build a Movement, http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/12/25/what-it-takes-to-build-a-movement/)

So why the defeatism? In the absence of knowledge of how these historical movements were built, young people assume that they arose spontaneously, or, perhaps, charismatic leaders suddenly called them into existence. On the third Monday of every January we celebrate Martin Luther King having had a dream; knowledge of the movement itself is lost. The current anti-war movement’s weakness, however, is very much alive in young people’s experience. They cite the fact that millions turned out in the streets in the early spring of 2003 to oppose the pending U.S. attack on Iraq, but that these demonstrations had no effect. ”We demonstrated and they didn’t listen to us.” Even the activists among them became demoralized as numbers at demonstrations dropped off very quickly, street demonstrations becoming cliches, and, despite a massive shift in public opinion in 2006, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan droned on to today. The very success of the spontaneous early mobilization seems to have contributed to the anti-war movement’s long-term weakness. Something’s missing. I first got an insight into articulating what it is when I picked up Letters from Young Activists: Today’s Rebels Speak Out, edited by Dan Berger, Chesa Boudin, and Kenyon Farrow (Nation Books, 2005). Andy Cornell, in a letter to the movement that first radicalized him, “Dear Punk Rock Activism,” criticizes the conflation of the terms “activism” and “organizing.” He writes, “activists are individuals who dedicate their time and energy to various efforts they hope will contribute to social, political, or economic change. Organizers are activists who, in addition to their own participation, work to move other people to take action and help them develop skills, political analysis and confidence within the context of organizations. Organizing is a process—creating long-term campaigns that mobilize a certain constituency to press for specific demands from a particular target, using a defined strategy and escalating tactics.” In other words, it’s not enough for punks to continually express their contempt for mainstream values through their alternate identity; they’ve got to move toward “organizing masses of people.” Aha! Activism = self-expression; organizing = movement-building. Until recently I’d rarely heard young people call themselves “organizers.” The common term for years has been “activists.” Organizing was reduced to the behind-the scenes nuts-and-bolts work needed to pull off a specific event, such as a concert or demonstration. But forty years ago, we only used the word “activist” to mock our enemies’ view of us, as when a university administrator or newspaper editorial writer would call us “mindless activists.” We were organizers, our work was building a mass movement, and that took constant discussion of goals, strategy, and tactics (and later, contributing to our downfall, ideology). Thinking back over my own experience, I realized that I had inherited this organizer’s identity from the red diaper babies I fell in with at the Columbia chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, SDS. Raised by parents in the labor and civil rights and communist or socialist movements, they had naturally learned the organizing method as other kids learned how to throw footballs or bake pineapple upside-down cakes. ”Build the base!” was the constant strategy of Columbia SDS for years. Yet young activists I met were surprised to learn that major events such as the Columbia rebellion of April, 1968, did not happen spontaneously, that they took years of prior education, relationship building, reconsideration on the part of individuals of their role in the institution. I.e., organizing. It seemed to me that they believed that movements happen as a sort of dramatic or spectator sport: after a small group of people express themselves, large numbers of by-standers see the truth in what they’re saying and join in. The mass anti-war mobilization of the Spring, 2003, which failed to stop the war, was the only model they knew.

Anti-war activism is a gateway to all other forms of social activism- it’s a key entry point for all social justice.

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Leslie Cagan is a stalwart of the antiwar movement. Born in 1947, she was raised by an activist family and attended "Ban the Bomb" rallies in the 1950s. As a college student at New York University, she was the key organizer for her campus' sizeable delegation to the October 1967 March on the Pentagon. Cagan was a lead organizer of an anti-nuclear rally in Central Park that was attended by hundreds of thousands of people and was National Coordinator of the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. With the anticipation of a new war in Iraq, Cagan became National Coordinator of United for Peace and Justice in 2002, the nation's largest and broadest peace coalition during the presidency of George W. Bush, a role that she filled until 2009 (Cagan 2008). Despite Cagan's impeccable credentials as an antiwar activist, it would be a mistake to think of her only as an antiwar activist. She has managed political campaigns and been active in other social movements, such as the lesbian-gay rights movement and the campaign to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba (Hedges 2003). Like many peace activists, Cagan steered her efforts toward other causes during times of relative peacetime. Yet her antiwar stance informs these efforts: "the undercurrent of it all is that . . . sense that without peace, and until there is peace, it'll be virtually impossible to really bring full economic justice, social justice? (Cagan 2008). Like Cagan, many other antiwar activists bring peace frames to their involvement in other movementse (Carroll and Ratner 1996). Activism changes people's lives (McAdam 1989). Previous scholarship has demonstrated that the paths that people take into and through activism affect how their lives are changed (Blee 2011; Fisher 2006; Fisher and McInerney 2012; Han 2009; Munson 2010; Viterna 2006). For example, how people are recruited into activism (Fisher 2006; Fisher and McInerney 2012) and the organizations that they join (Han 2009; Munson 2008) makes a difference for how long they remain involved in activism and what types of activities they engage in. These studies, however, have failed to distinguish between movements in terms of how participation in one movement may influence an individual’s activist path differently than participation in another movement. Activists live in a world of multiple, interacting social movements (Evans and Kay 2008; Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006; McAdam 1995; Minkoff 1997; Voss and Sherman 2000; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Meyer and Whittier 1994). In this article, we examine the paths that activists navigate in switching from movement to movement over time. In particular, we argue that antiwar activists pursue distinctive paths in comparison to other progressive activists. This article proceeds, first, by considering the extant scholarship on paths to and through activism. Second, it argues that antiwar activists are likely to pursue paths that diverge from those of other progressive activists. Third, it examines the methods and rationale for conducting a survey of 691 activists who attended the 2010 US Social Forum, one of the largest assemblies of progressive activists in the United States. Fourth, it explains sequence analysis as an approach to analyzing data on activist paths. Fifth, it demonstrates the distinctiveness of antiwar activists? paths using regression analysis. The article concludes by explaining the aggregate consequences that these paths they have for the broader environment of progressive activists.

#### Particular demands are more radical than universal demands- we are more threatening to the state

Zizek 1998—Slavoj, professor at the University of Ljubljana, *Law and the Postmodern Mind*, p. 92

The dialectical tension between the vulnerability and invulnerability of the system also enables us to denounce the ultimate racist and/or sexist trick, that of "Two birds in the bush instead of a bird in the hand": when women demand simple equality, quasi-"feminists" often pretend to offer them "much more" (the role of the warm and wise "conscience of society" elevated above the vulgar everyday competition and struggle for domination... )­the only proper answer to this offer, of course, is "No thanks! Better is the enemy of the good! We do not want more just equality!" Here, at least, the last lines in Now Voyager ("Why reach for the moon, when we can have the stars?") are wrong. It is homologous with the Native American who wants to become integrated into the predominant "white" society. And a politically correct progressive liberal endeavors to convince him that he is thereby renouncing his very unique prerogative. The authentic native culture and tradition- no thanks, simple equality is enough. 1 also wouldn't mind my part of consumerist alienation!... A modest demand of the excluded group for the full participation at the society's universal rights is much more threatening for the system than the apparently much more "radical" rejection of the predominant "social values" and the assertion of the superiority of one's own culture. For a true feminist, Otto Weininger's assertion that, although women are "ontologically false," lacking the proper ethical stature, they should be acknowledged the same rights as men in public life is infinitely more acceptable than the false elevation of women that makes them too good for the banality of men's rights. Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion, is automatically "co-opted." On the contrary, the very fear of being co-opted that makes us search for more and more "radical", "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that the true subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes. \_a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or a social democrat, as le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the central committee is worth more than a thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at proving the system, making it more efficient- he nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows- the system is not only infinitely more resistant than invulnerable than it may appear (it can co-opt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support). It is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc. can have a larger unforeseen catastrophic consequences).

**Zizek 2007**—12/13, Slavoj, professor at the University of Ljubljana, co-director of the International Centre for Humanities at Birkbeck, Resistance is Surrender, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/zize01\_.html  
One of the clearest lessons of the last few decades is that capitalism is indestructible. Marx compared it to a vampire, and one of the salient points of comparison now appears to be that vampires always rise up again after being stabbed to death. Even Mao’s attempt, in the Cultural Revolution, to wipe out the traces of capitalism, ended up in its triumphant return. Today’s Left reacts in a wide variety of ways to the hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal democracy. It might, for example, accept the hegemony, but continue to fight for reform within its rules (this is Third Way social democracy). **Or, it accepts that the hegemony is here to stay, but should nonetheless be resisted from its ‘interstices’.** Or, it accepts the futility of all struggle, since the hegemony is so all-encompassing that nothing can really be done except wait for an outburst of ‘divine violence’ – a revolutionary version of Heidegger’s ‘only God can save us.’ Or, it recognises the temporary futility of the struggle. In today’s triumph of global capitalism, the argument goes, true resistance is not possible, so all we can do till the revolutionary spirit of the global working class is renewed is defend what remains of the welfare state, confronting those in power with demands we know they cannot fulfil, and otherwise withdraw into cultural studies, where one can quietly pursue the work of criticism. Or, it emphasises the fact that the problem is a more fundamental one, that global capitalism is ultimately an effect of the underlying principles of technology or ‘instrumental reason’. Or, it posits that one can undermine global capitalism and state power, not by directly attacking them, but by refocusing the field of struggle on everyday practices, where one can ‘build a new world’; in this way, the foundations of the power of capital and the state will be gradually undermined, and, at some point, the state will collapse (the exemplar of this approach is the Zapatista movement). Or, it takes the ‘postmodern’ route, shifting the accent from anti-capitalist struggle to the multiple forms of politico-ideological struggle for hegemony, emphasising the importance of discursive re-articulation. Or, it wagers that one can repeat at the postmodern level the classical Marxist gesture of enacting the ‘determinate negation’ of capitalism: with today’s rise of ‘cognitive work’, the contradiction between social production and capitalist relations has become starker than ever, rendering possible for the first time ‘absolute democracy’ (this would be Hardt and Negri’s position). These positions are not presented as a way of avoiding some ‘true’ radical Left politics – what they are trying to get around is, indeed, the lack of such a position. This defeat of the Left is not the whole story of the last thirty years, however. There is another, no less surprising, lesson to be learned from the Chinese Communists’ presiding over arguably the most explosive development of capitalism in history, and from the growth of West European Third Way social democracy. It is, in short: we can do it better. In the UK, the Thatcher revolution was, at the time, chaotic and impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies. It was Tony Blair who was able to institutionalise it, or, in Hegel’s terms, to raise (what first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. Thatcher wasn’t a Thatcherite, she was merely herself; it was Blair (more than Major) who truly gave form to Thatcherism. The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the ‘old paradigm’: **the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control.** This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left. Simon Critchley’s recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position.[[\*]](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/zize01_.html#footnotes) For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, **ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms.** The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the ‘infinitely demanding’ call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the ‘real-political’ one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). ‘Of course,’ Critchley writes, history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes. So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should ‘mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty’ one opposes? Shouldn’t the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use ‘mocking satire and feather dusters’? The ambiguity of Critchley’s position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, **‘calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect’?** These words simply demonstrate that today’s liberal-democratic state and the dream of an ‘infinitely demanding’ anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley’s anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; **and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be.** In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’ It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital’s ‘resistance’ to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? ‘No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place’? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown – but wouldn’t such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as ‘Subcomediante Marcos’? Today, it is the great capitalists – Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters – who ‘resist’ the state. The lesson here is that **the truly subversive thing is not to insist on ‘infinite’ demands we know those in power cannot fulfill.** Since they know that we know it, such an ‘infinitely demanding’ attitude presents no problem for those in power: ‘So wonderful that, with your critical demands, you remind us what kind of world we would all like to live in. Unfortunately, we live in the real world, where we have to make do with what is possible.’ **The thing to do is, on the contrary, to bombard those in power with strategically** well-selected, precise, finite demands, **which can’t be met with the same excuse.**

### 1ar at: Role Playing

#### Anti-war activism is a key entry point for other social justice movements-

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Recent data shows that peace movement continues to be central for American social

movement activists. In June 2010, we surveyed 691 participants of the US Social Forum, a survey explained in detail later in this paper. We asked respondents to describe the first public 11 political gathering that they attended and to remember the approximate year of the event. That question provides data about the mobilization pathways of current social movement activists. For each respondent, we recorded the complete verbal description and the year. Then, we coded the topic of the activist's first event (e.g., anti-nuclear or gay rights). Figure 1 shows the data sorted by decade and focuses on the five most popular topics (antiwar/peace; civil rights; labor; immigration; women's rights). [Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 shows that the antiwar movement is, by far, the most popular entry point for the respondents. Not surprisingly, a majority of respondents who began activism in the 1960s first attended antiwar war events. Antiwar protest was the entry point for 48% of respondents who began activism in the 2000s. Antiwar activism remained the most popular entry point for respondents who initially mobilized in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. This is remarkable considering that American wars were much more limited in scope between Vietnam and Iraq. Still, peace continued to attract a plurality of activists. Figure 1 bolsters earlier research. Antiwar activism fluctuates in relative importance as wars come and go, but it remains a central policy domain for progressive activists.

#### Highlighting the compatability between movements is key—the permutation makes it more likely that people join up with their struggle.

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These studies suggest that scholars should more systematically examine how individual activists navigate a social world where activists may move among policy domains. Entry into activism through one movement gives an individual access to a larger array of allied movements. It is natural to then ask about the factors that encourage activists to switch or combine issues and the outcomes associated with particular activism trajectories. The rest of this paper examines activism trajectories, which we define as the temporal sequence of participation in one or more movements. That is, an "activist trajectory" is a list of the movements that someone has joined over time. Some trajectories may be simple; an activist may prefer to participate in immigration rallies and nothing else. Other trajectories may be highly complex. An activist may have begun their political career by joining a civil rights movement march in the 1960s, then joined a women's group in the early 1970s. Later, the activist may have moved away from civil rights altogether and joined an immigration rights organization in the 1980s. Multiple studies of activist biographies (Jasper 1999; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Heaney and Rojas 2010) show that a substantial group of people migrate among movements or simultaneously participate in multiple movements. We consider two questions about activist trajectories. First, how does initial mobilization affect a subsequent activism trajectory? In other words, does it matter how an activist got involved in politics? Entry into activism may affect a subsequent trajectory through numerous mechanisms. The recruiting movement may have a relatively central position in the wider social movement field. Some movements may have many connections to other movements. For example, historical and sociological accounts of the civil rights movement have documented its many overlaps with the women’s rights movement, the Vietnam War movement, and others (e.g., Minkoff 1997) . In contrast, some movements may have a more circumscribed role. Bearman and Everett’s (1993) study of Washington, DC organizations also showed that some movements occupied more peripheral positions in activist networks. Thus, entry through more central movements would be associated with trajectories where activists associate with many different movements.

#### Focusing public deliberation on the area of technology is critical to challenging modern war

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Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare. Cornell Law Review, 98(1), 209-238.

While others focus on the WPR itself,161 the emphasis of this Note is on the public’s role in preventing unilateral presidential action. In this respect, the simplest solution for the numbing effect of contemporary warfare is an increased level of public attentiveness and scrutiny concerning military actions abroad, regardless of the lack of visible costs at home. As we have seen, once the public becomes vigilant about our less-visible foreign actions, we can expect our politicians to become receptive to domestic law. But as this Note points out, the issues surrounding a toothless WPR will continue to grow and amplify as society enters a new age of technology-driven warfare. Thus, there is a pressing need for greater public awareness of the new, and perhaps less obvious, consequences of our actions abroad.162 Perhaps taking note of these unforeseen costs will improve the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad and create real incentives to enforce the WPR.

#### We control uniqueness---war is rampant now because the left has decided its not their concern

Weeks 11 (Linton, staff writer for NPR, “Whatever Happened To The Anti-War Movement?,” http://www.npr.org/2011/04/15/135391188/whatever-happened-to-the-anti-war-movement)

In the post, he points out that American protests against wars seemed to stop the moment Barack Obama was elected president in 2008. "Maybe anti-war organizers assumed that they had elected the man who would stop the war," he observes. But the wars have continued. More than two-thirds of Americans have opposed military intervention in Libya, Boaz reports, and nearly two-thirds of Americans — a number that is up dramatically since early 2010 — believe the war in Afghanistan hasn't been worth fighting. "Where are their leaders?" Boaz wants to know. "Where are the senators pushing for withdrawal? Where are the organizations?" He concludes that the anti-war activity in the United States — and around the world — a few years ago "was driven as much by antipathy to George W. Bush as by actual opposition to war and intervention." To buttress his assertions, Boaz cites a recently published study of anti-war protesters. The research was conducted by Michael Heaney of the University of Michigan and Fabio Rojas of Indiana University. It concludes that the anti-war movement in America evaporated because Democrats — inspired to protest by their anti-Republican feelings — stopped protesting once the Democratic Party achieved success in Congress in 2006 and then in the White House in 2008.